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Abstract
When trying to make sense of uncertain situations, we might rely on summary information
from a description, or information gathered from our personal experience. There are two
approaches that both attempt to explain how we make risky decisions using descriptive or
experiential information—the cognitive-based explanation from the description-experience gap,
and the emotion-based explanation from the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH). This dissertation
brings together these two approaches to better understand how we make risky decisions.
Four options were presented, with options differing in terms of advantageousness and
riskiness. How easy or difficult it was to consciously comprehend the reward structure, or
cognitive penetrability, was manipulated by displaying single outcomes or multiple, diverse
outcomes per trial. Within the description or experience task, participants were randomly assigned
to the more or less penetrable version of an all gain or all loss set of options. How often the riskier
or advantageous options were chosen served as a measure of risky or advantageous decision
making.
Regardless of penetrability, risk preferences were generally but not completely as predicted
by the SMH. Instead, the primary effect of cognitive penetrability was on advantageous decision
making. Furthermore, description was found to be more cognitively penetrable than experience.
Overall, the results suggest that clarification is needed regarding how somatic markers are formed
in the loss versus gain domain, and future research should consider the difference in penetrability
between description and experience when trying to explain preferences between the two decisions.
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Comparing Two Perspectives for Understanding Decisions from Description and
Experience
We are constantly trying to adapt to an uncertain world. One example of how we try to
make sense of uncertain situations is through reliance on summary information that is provided to
us by others. This method is common, for instance, in the classroom and on websites, wherein
information has been accumulated for us. Summary information is often comprehensive and can
be available at any given moment. Another example of how we try to make sense of uncertain
situations is through reliance on our experience, especially through repeated interaction with and
feedback from the environment. This is the primary method of learning when we are very young
and interacting with the world for the first time, and it continues to remain essential as we get
older. Unlike summary information, we generally only have input from what is currently being
experienced as well as access to memories about what has happened to us in the past.
There is evidence suggesting that how we make risky decisions differs depending on
whether we are relying on summary information from a description or on information gathered
from personal experience. These differences have been documented in research on what has been
called the “description-experience gap” (D-E gap; e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009). The traditional
description paradigm typically presents risky choices described as outcomes and probabilities
within gambles. This is contrasted with experience paradigms, like the computerized money
machine (CMM), which involves learning the outcomes and probabilities of a gamble through
repeated, direct experiences of outcomes over time. Researchers have repeatedly shown that
choices between two gamble options that are simply described are often quite different from
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choices of comparable gambles when they are experienced directly through a series of plays of
each gamble.
One suggested explanation in the literature for this D-E gap in preferences suggests that
the difference is based on cognitive processes.

In particular, the explanation suggests the

difference is primarily due to how unlikely versus likely events are weighted. When relying on a
descriptive summary, its comprehensiveness means that information about likely and unlikely
events can be combined and expressed in a single statement that gives equal emphasis to each
potential outcome, regardless of whether it is relatively likely or unlikely to occur. The prediction
is that this form of presentation leads to a tendency to exaggerate the importance and impact of
events that are relatively unlikely. With unlikely and likely events being described with the same
emphasis, unlikely events may be just as salient and given just as much attention as more likely
ones, despite being less likely to occur. Relatively speaking, these unlikely outcomes would thus
be overweighted with respect to their likelihood, just as the more likely events would be
underweighted.
In contrast, when relying on experience, we only have information (mostly in the form of
memories) about the outcomes that actually occurred when the gamble was played. Thus, the
salience of and attention to unlikely events would be relatively low as these occur only rarely. In
contrast, the salience of and attention to likely events would be relatively high as these occur quite
frequently. The prediction in this case is that we will weigh the outcomes in a fashion that more
closely aligns with their likelihood, and that this tendency may be even more extreme than it should
be given the nature of memory (i.e., “out of sight, out of mind”). With decision from experience,
we may give much less weight to unlikely events than likely events, and may even discount or
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ignore the importance and impact of unlikely events, precisely because they are not often
experienced.
There is another popular theoretical approach to decision making that offers an emotionbased explanation of how we make risky decisions from experience. This approach involves the
influential somatic marker hypothesis (SMH; e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005) which puts
emphasis on the impact of emotion-based signals, or somatic markers, that are presumed to be
created by encountering and interacting with the environment, or through experience. Somatic
markers are defined as a collection of body responses that indicate a positive or negative feeling
state. For example, if something good or bad is experienced as the result of an action, a positive or
negative somatic marker (respectively) is hypothesized to develop. These somatic markers are
predicted to serve as signals to the expected valence of the consequences (good or bad) of an
action, and to consciously or unconsciously assist in the selection of advantageous over
disadvantageous responses (approach or avoid).
Support for the somatic marker hypothesis has primarily come from research using the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), which involves learning the outcomes and probabilities of different
options through repeatedly selecting from each of four decks of cards. The participant’s goal is to
learn over time to select cards from the decks that tend to be more advantageous in the long run.
Successful performance on the IGT is expected to be the result of emotion-based learning via
somatic markers.
Both of these bodies of literature share the aim of explaining how we make risky decisions.
However, little has been done to bring together these two perspectives and their respective research
paradigms. In this dissertation, I will attempt to bring them together by addressing two goals. The
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primary goal is to better understand how we make decisions from experience by comparing the
cognition-based and emotion-based explanations. The secondary goal is to extend the D-E gap
literature by exploring whether the gap generalizes to a related but somewhat different context
often studied in the SMH literature.
Decisions from Description: A Historical Perspective
As far back as Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1954), often referred to as the father of economic
utility theory, traditional description paradigms have been overwhelmingly used to study risky
choice. The paradigm is often referred to as the gambling (or risky choice) paradigm (e.g., Lopes,
1983), and it has been essential to the development of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). Prospect theory has been the dominant descriptive theory of risky choice for decades (e.g.,
Barberis, 2013).
In the standard gambling paradigm, participants make choices between pairs of
hypothetical gambles. The gambles within any given pair typically have equal expected values, or
the same expected earnings in the long run. As can be seen in the example in Figure 1, all possible
outcomes and probabilities are explicitly provided to the decision maker. This is a fundamental
characteristic of studies of decisions from description.

Figure 1. Example of a described pair of hypothetical gambles (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

For each gamble pair, the decision maker is asked to choose which of the two gambles he
or she would prefer to play. Risk preference is inferred from the choice. Choosing the higher
4

variance gamble in the pair is classified as risk seeking, whereas choosing the lower variance
gamble or sure thing in the pair is classified as risk aversion. Risk is typically defined as a function
of variability (rather than danger) by economists and psychologists (e.g., Arrow, 1965). The higher
the variability, or the greater the spread of the distribution of possible outcomes, the greater the
amount of risk.
Prospect theory, through the use of the gambling paradigm, has provided a wealth of insight
into how we make risky decisions when the options are described. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
proposed an S-shaped value function, which is shown in Figure 2, which separates outcomes
according to gains or losses, relative to a reference point. The value function has three fundamental
components—reference dependence, marginally decreasing sensitivity, and loss aversion.
Reference dependence refers to the reliance on an anchor or starting point, often the status quo.
The reference point is at the middle of the value function, and signifies that people psychologically
separate possible outcomes into gain and loss domains. Marginally decreasing sensitivity,
originally proposed by Bernoulli but adopted by Kahneman and Tversky, refers to the idea that
people are less likely to notice or appreciate a change in wealth the further away they are from
their reference point. This is depicted in the shape of the function, which is concave in the gain
domain and convex in the loss domain. Loss aversion refers to the idea that people feel worse
about a loss than they feel good about the same size gain. In other words, “losses loom larger than
gains.” To represent this, the value function in the loss domain has a steeper curve than in the gain
domain.
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Figure 2. Prospect theory’s value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

As can be seen in Figure 3, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also proposed a hypothetical decision
weighting function that measures the “impact of events on the desirability of the options.” The
stated (objective) probabilities of the events range from zero (0%; impossibility) to one (100%;
certainty), as shown on the X-axis. The dotted line represents a linear relationship between
decision weights and stated probability, whereas the solid curve represents the original weighting
function proposed in prospect theory. The solid curve is higher than the dotted line when the stated
probabilities are small or close to zero, provided the values are not too extreme. This implies that
low-probability events are generally overweighted, or given more impact than warranted based on
their stated probabilities. The opposite is expected for higher-probability events, as the solid curve
is lower than the dotted line for values above about 25%. In this case, decision weights tend to
give less impact to the outcome than warranted based on the probability. The weighting function
is described as not “well-behaved” near the endpoints because people have a limited ability to
evaluate very low- and very high-probability events. The weighting function has been supported
empirically (e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Fox, 1995). Subsequent research has led to
modifications of the weighting function; namely, different weighting functions for gains and losses
that address weighting at the endpoints (cumulative prospect theory; e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
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1992). Nevertheless, the prediction remains that for all values but the extremes, smaller
probabilities tend to be overweighted and larger probabilities tend to be underweighted.

Figure 3. Prospect theory’s hypothetical weighting function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

The fundamental components of the value and weighting functions come together to
produce predictions regarding risk preferences in decisions from description. Decreasing
sensitivity for larger outcomes, coupled by underweighting of most probabilities, supports risk
aversion for gains, and risk seeking for losses. This pattern is referred to as the “reflection effect”
because preferences for described gambles reverse when they are reflected about the y-axis of the
value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; see Kuhberger, 1998 for a review).
Historically, predictions about risky choice have been generated largely using traditional
description paradigms. Although the findings have proved useful for understanding how we make
some risky decisions, they may not generalize to experiences common to everyday life. We often
do not have access to described, summary information when making decisions, and instead have
to rely on our experiences.
7

This dissertation explores how decisions from experience are likely to differ from those
based on description. Although I will assess how decisions from description and experience
compare, the primary goal of this dissertation is to better understand decision processes involved
when we have to rely on our experiences to make choices. In particular, I will compare two
different approaches that both attempt to explain how we make decisions from experience. One
approach is a cognition-based explanation that comes from the description-experience gap (D-E
gap) tradition of focusing on how probabilities are weighted. Another approach is an emotionbased explanation that puts emphasis on the importance of emotion-based signals that assist in the
selection of advantageous responses. These approaches are reviewed in the sections that follow.
Cognition-Based Explanation for Decisions from Experience: The Description-Experience
Gap Tradition
Decisions based on experience have been studied for decades, initially studied in the
context of multiple cue probability learning (see, e.g., Brehmer, 1980; Holzworth, 2001) or
probability matching (see, e.g.,Vulkan, 2000). These investigations explored whether and how
people learned correct probabilities for outcomes, and indicated both strengths and weaknesses
in people’s abilities to learn from series of events. However, the purpose has typically been to
study the accuracy of predictions rather than risk taking.
Interest in risky decisions from experience has become more pronounced due to what has
been termed the D-E gap in risky decisions. Evidence of the D-E gap has been obtained through
the development of paradigms to serve as experience-based analogies to the gambling paradigm.
A common paradigm used to represent and study decisions from experience in the D-E gap
tradition is the computerized money machine (CMM; Barron & Erev, 2003). The CMM involves
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presenting two options on the computer, as seen in Figure 4. Common options include a risky
option with two outcomes, and a sure-thing option. The outcome and probability information of
the options is initially unknown and must be learned through repeated, direct experience of
outcomes over time. This is a defining characteristic of studies of decisions from experience.

Figure 4. The computerized money machine (CMM; Barron & Erev, 2003). The two identical gray
squares represent the two options from which to choose. The outcome received in a given trial is
displayed directly below the two options, and a running total is displayed directly below the
outcome received. Points are converted into monetary payoffs (100 points=0.05 Shekels, about
$1.25US).
Typically, for one hundred or more trials, a participant learns about options by clicking on
one of the two buttons to see the outcome it reveals. The computer randomly draws a single
outcome from the underlying payoff distribution associated with the chosen option. Both options
have payoff distributions of equal expected value, mirroring payoff distributions found in the fullydescribed options used in the (description-based) gambling paradigm. In a common version of the
CMM known as the partial-feedback version, the single outcome drawn would be displayed and
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the current earnings updated. Two other versions include sampling and full feedback. In the
sampling version, participants select from the options as much as the want without consequence
before choosing the option they prefer. This is sometimes referred to as “one-shot decision
making.” Full feedback is identical to partial feedback, except that participants learn about the
outcome that they received and the outcome that they would have received if the other option had
been chosen.
Characteristics of risky decisions from experience have been explored in several relatively
recent studies (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Weber, Shafir,
& Blais, 2004; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006). Across all three versions of the CMM, participants
tended to be risk seeking when the desirable outcome occurred with a high probability, and risk
averse when the desirable outcome occurred with low probability. This effect is typically explained
by the underweighting of low probability, or rare, events (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et
al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
Rare events are proposed to be underweighted in decisions from experience because they
are not often encountered (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). Recency effects, wherein recent outcomes
receive greater weight than earlier outcomes, may also contribute to the underweighting of rare
events. In the sampling paradigm, for instance, Hertwig and colleagues (2004) observed that
outcomes encountered later in a sequence were given relatively more weight than those
encountered earlier. This provides support for the potential role of recency effects in decisions
from experience, though subsequent research suggests that it may not play a major role (e.g.,
Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008).
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Other research has explored how outcomes, not just probabilities, are weighted in decisions
from experience (e.g., Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2014; Madan, Ludvig,
& Spetch, 2014). Ludvig and colleagues (2014) proposed that the biggest, extreme gains and losses
are overweighted in decisions from experience, which is opposite what is proposed by prospect
theory. Nevertheless, this effect may be weaker than that of probability underweighting. According
to the authors, all else equal, a rare, extreme outcome in an option may be underweighted less than
a rare, non-extreme outcome in an option. In the D-E gap tradition, then, the primary focus remains
how probabilities are weighted in decisions from experience.
Emotion-Based Explanation for Decisions from Experience: Somatic Marker Hypothesis
An alternative approach to understanding decisions from experience relies on emotionbased processes to explain risky choice. The SMH provides a neurobiological account of how
people make decisions, emphasizing the impact of emotion-based signals, or somatic markers.
The SMH was developed in an attempt to understand cases involving brain damage.
Perhaps the most famous case was that of Phineas Gage, who experienced damage to the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). This resulted in serious impairments in decision-making
leading to financial loss, social isolation, and exposure to physical harm. Patients with lesions in
this area have similar real-life decision-making impairments. Surprisingly, in most cases, these
patients do not show evidence of deficits in intellect, working memory, or attention (e.g., Saver &
Damasio, 1991), which are the functional areas that would typically be targeted as essential for
well-reasoned decisions. Instead, these patients demonstrate an inability to appropriately express
emotion or experience feelings (e.g., Damasio, Tranel, Damasio, 1990).
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Thus, Damasio and colleagues (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994) argued
that healthy affective responses are also crucial for sound decision-making, not just knowledge
and reason. In particular, they hypothesized that the essential emotional mechanism comes in the
form of positive and negative emotion-based signals, or somatic markers. This has come to be
known as the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH).
Iowa Gambling Task. Support for the SMH has primarily come from research using a
paradigm called the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Created by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and
Anderson (1994), it is designed to mimic real-life decision making by incorporating rewards and
punishments, as well as elements of uncertainty. Like other experience paradigms, participants
have to learn through repeated, direct experience of the rewards and punishments making up the
payoff structure, instead of being explicitly provided the information.
As can be seen in Figure 5, the standard IGT consists of four decks of cards, named A, B,
C, and D, presented on the computer (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; see Bechara
et al., 1994 for a version using physical playing cards).

Figure 5. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), adapted for the iPad.
12

The decision maker starts with $2000, and is told to try to win as much as possible by the
end of the task. On a given trial, the participant selects a card from any one of the four decks. He
or she then receives information from that card about the outcome, which is either a gain or a gain
coupled with a loss. The current earnings, which are displayed on the computer, are updated
accordingly. In Figure 5, a card from Deck B was chosen by the decision maker. There was a gain
of $100, a loss of $0, and the current earnings increased from $2000 to $2100.
Only the experimenter is aware of the length of the task (100 trials), the number of cards
in each deck (40 cards), and the fixed payoff structure for each deck. Table 1 provides information
regarding the fixed payoff structure for each of the first ten cards in the four decks of the standard
IGT.
Table 1
Outcome Sequence of Standard IGT

In each deck, a card is always associated with a gain, and sometimes associated with a
simultaneous loss; in other words, some cards carry multiple outcomes involving a gain coupled
with a loss. Rewards occur when there is a net gain, which happens when there is a gain but no
loss or the loss is less than the gain. Punishments occur when there is a net loss, which happens
whenever the loss is bigger than the gain. Cards with equivalent gain and loss outcomes are
breakeven cards with a net of zero.
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The first ten cards for each deck demonstrate the general payoff structure for the remaining
thirty cards. Cards in Deck A always have a $100 gain and frequently (50%) also have a
moderately-sized loss ranging from $150 to $350, whereas cards in Deck B also always have a
$100 gain but infrequently (10%) also have larger losses of $1250. Playing from these decks results
in an overall loss of roughly $25 per trial in the long run, i.e., they have a negative expected value
and as such are designed to be disadvantageous.
Cards in Deck C always have a $50 gain and frequently also have a relatively small loss
ranging from $25 to $75, whereas cards in Deck D always have a $50 gain and infrequently also
have a moderately-sized loss of $250. Playing from these decks results in an overall gain of roughly
$25 per trial in the long run, i.e., they have a positive expected value and are therefore considered
advantageous.
The IGT was intentionally designed to make the payoff structure of each deck difficult to
discern. That way, participants would not solely be able to rely on exact gain and loss calculations
when making decisions about which deck to choose. Instead, participants would be more likely to
rely on implicit decision-making processes and the intuitive affective responses associated with
somatic markers.
Somatic marker hypothesis. Fundamental to the SMH is that decision making is
influenced by somatic markers. Somatic markers are defined in the SMH as “the collection of
body-related responses that hallmark an emotion” (Bechara & Damasio, 2005, p. 339). Bechara
and Damasio (2005) propose that somatic states can be established via primary and secondary
inducers. Primary inducers are innate or learned stimuli that automatically cause a positive or
negative somatic response. An example of a primary inducer is encountering a deadly snake, which
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automatically induces an aversive affective state, and a negative somatic marker. Another example
of a primary inducer is learning that you have won the lottery, which automatically induces a
pleasurable affective state, and a positive somatic marker. The amygdala is proposed to be critical
for triggering somatic responses from primary inducers, as it is an important brain structure
involved in the fast and automatic linking of a stimulus to its affective value.
Secondary inducers are “thoughts” and “memories” of primary inducers that cause a
positive or negative somatic response when recalled. An example of a secondary inducer is
imagining that you encountered a snake, which induces a negative somatic state. Another example
of a secondary inducer is the memory of winning the lottery, which induces a positive somatic
state. The vmPFC is proposed to be critical for triggering somatic responses from secondary
inducers, as it is an important brain structure involved in connecting memory systems to emotional
systems (which involve the amygdala). This connection is crucial in reactivating the somatic
response associated with a previously-encountered stimulus, thereby helping to predict future
consequences of decisions.
According to the SMH, numerous and potentially conflicting somatic states can be
triggered at the same time. Bechara and Damasio (2005) propose that this is handled by way of
stronger somatic states gaining advantage over weaker somatic states. The strength of the somatic
state triggered determines whether it will be triggered again, or whether it will be eliminated.
Stronger somatic markers are therefore assumed to be reinforced and weaker somatic markers are
assumed to be eventually eliminated. In due course, an overall, dominant positive or negative
somatic state is predicted to develop. The overall somatic state can then consciously or
unconsciously assist in the selection of advantageous over disadvantageous responses.
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This begs the question: what determines the strength of a somatic marker? Bechara and
Damasio (2005) suggest that the frequency of an outcome is important for determining the strength
of a somatic marker—“events that are highly probable (i.e., almost certain)…they trigger stronger
somatic states relative to less probable ones” (p. 357). The authors used this claim to provide
support for the risk preference patterns predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979),
i.e., risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. According to Bechara and Damasio (2005),
“information conveying sure outcomes trigger stronger somatic responses than information
conveying less probable outcomes” (p. 358). For example, the authors propose that a sure gain of
$100 triggers a stronger positive somatic state than a probable gain of $200, thereby making the
sure-gain option look more attractive than the risky option.
Across many tests of the IGT (see Dunn et al., 2006, Reimann & Bechara, 2010, and
Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010 for reviews), healthy participants without brain
damage are typically able to eventually choose from the advantageous decks over time.
Participants with damage to the amygdala or vmPFC are typically unable to eventually choose
from the advantageous decks over time. Instead, they continue to choose from the disadvantageous
decks throughout the task. Performance on the IGT is considered a proxy for real-life decisionmaking impairment, suggesting that day-to-day functioning with these types of brain damage are
likely to lead to disadvantageous decisions and behaviors. Bechara and Damasio (2005) propose
that participants with damage to the amygdala or vmPFC behave disadvantageously on the IGT
because of a failure to generate (or in some cases incorporate) somatic markers during the decisionmaking process.
Support for the claim that disadvantageous performance on the IGT is due to a failure to
generate somatic markers comes from studies that included a physiological measure of somatic
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state activation, skin conductance responses (SCRs) (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999). For healthy,
amygdala-damaged, and vmPFC-damaged participants, SCRs were measured while they
performed on the IGT.
Healthy participants developed SCRs in response to immediate rewards and punishments,
with the authors suggesting that somatic markers were activated in response to the primary inducer
of winning or losing. Healthy participants also developed SCRs prior to choosing a deck, or
anticipatory SCRs. Anticipatory SCRs were more pronounced when choosing from the
disadvantageous than advantageous decks. The authors suggested that anticipatory SCRs before
choosing from the disadvantageous decks were an index of somatic marker activation in response
to the thought of winning or losing. This helped healthy people to eventually avoid
disadvantageous decks, as those decks were connected to the painful thought of losing. This also
helped them choose advantageous decks, as those decks were connected to the pleasurable thought
of winning.
Participants with amygdala damage did not develop SCRs in response to immediate
rewards and punishments or anticipatory SCRs before choosing from the disadvantageous decks.
The authors proposed that somatic markers were not activated in response to immediate rewards
and punishments, which led to a failure to register the painful (or pleasurable) feeling that should
be associated with the immediate outcome of losing (or winning). This “misled” the vmPFC, such
that disadvantageous decks were not able to be connected to the painful thought of losing, because
the painful feeling never registered. Without the ability to generate these somatic markers,
participants with amygdala damage were unable to eventually avoid the disadvantageous decks.
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Participants with vmPFC damage did develop (weak) SCRs in response to immediate
rewards and punishments, but did not develop anticipatory SCRs before choosing from the
disadvantageous decks. The authors proposed that somatic markers were (weakly) activated in
response to immediate rewards and punishments, so some sort of painful or pleasurable feeling
was registered, respectively. However, the disadvantageous decks were not able to be connected
the painful thought of losing. Therefore, participants could not use that connection to help them
eventually avoid disadvantageous decks. Instead, they continued to choose from disadvantageous
decks because they were still able to register pleasurable feelings in response to immediate
rewards. According to Bechara and Damasio (2005), participants with vmPFC damage were
insensitive to future consequences, or had a “myopia for the future”.
The SMH may contribute to our understanding of how we make decisions from experience
by demonstrating the importance of emotional mechanisms in decision making. According to the
SMH, not only are somatic markers important, they are necessary for doing well in situations that
do not easily allow for exact gain and loss calculations, and instead require reliance on previously
developed affective responses to similar situations. Moreover, this account has provided insight
into how different parts of the brain may operate to register and connect these affective responses
in support of advantageous decision-making.
Comparing Cognition and Emotion-Based Explanations for Decisions from Experience
When explaining how we make risky decisions from experience, research on decisions
from experience within the D-E gap tradition continues to rely exclusively on cognitive variables
involving the assigning of weights to probabilities. Research on the SMH, however, relies
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primarily on the importance of emotion-based signals, in the form of somatic markers. However,
it seems that both kinds of processes are likely to operate when making choices.
This distinction between cognitive and affective processes has been highlighted in dualprocess theories (e.g., Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich &
West, 2000). Two systems, System 1 and System 2, are proposed to process information
differently. System 1 is more closely aligned with the emotion-based explanation of the SMH.
System 1 involves a set of systems in the brain that is proposed to be intuitive and autonomous,
and not require working memory. It is typically characterized as fast, associative, and
nonconscious (i.e., automatic), and it relies upon implicit knowledge and basic emotions. Affective
processes, based more on System 1, are likely to predominate when aspects of a situation are able
to be registered without intention or effort (e.g., Kahneman, 2003). System 2 is more closely
aligned with the cognition-based explanation from the D-E gap tradition. System 2 is proposed to
be reflective and analytical, and does require working memory. It is typically characterized as
slow, rule-based, and conscious, and it relies upon explicit knowledge. Cognitive processes (at
least those associated with conscious thought), based more on System 2, are likely to predominate
when attention is drawn to the situation and a more in-depth evaluation or development of a
strategy is deemed necessary. In some cases, however, time constraints and capacity limits prevent
the application of cognitive processes, making it difficult of impossible to rely on System 2
processes, leaving System 1 to provide its intuitive response (e.g., swerving to avoid a car
accident). How System 1 and System 2 interact is still being investigated, but it is likely to depend
on the nature of the choice situation.
Choice situations that elicit and allow for reliance on predominantly cognitive processes
should yield risk preference patterns closer to a cognition-based explanation, i.e., in line with
19

probability weighting predictions. On the other hand, situations that elicit or require reliance on
predominantly affective processes should yield risk preferences closer to an emotion-based
explanation, i.e., in line with somatic marker predictions. Whether or not a situation ultimately
relies on predominantly cognitive or affective processes is likely to depend on how easy or difficult
it is to process the task at hand. In this dissertation, cognitive penetrability, or how easy or difficult
the current task is to fully comprehend, will be manipulated to create situations that will help
distinguish between the cognition-based and emotion-based predictions regarding how we make
risky decisions from experience.
Cognitive penetrability. Cognitive penetrability has been studied for decades, particularly
in the context of perception. Introduced by Pylyshyn (1980), the term “cognitive penetration” has
been used to refer to how higher-level cognitive processes can directly influence a perceptual
experience. More recently, cognitive penetrability has been discussed within the framework of the
SMH, and the IGT paradigm used to support it, and it is from here that our definition of cognitive
penetrability is taken.
For the purpose of this dissertation, cognitive penetrability is defined as whether or not
“the reward/punishment schedule can be consciously comprehended by participants” (Dunn et al.,
2006, p. 248). In at least one study, cognitive penetrability has been equated with conscious
knowledge, or awareness of the task structure. According to this definition, the less cognitively
penetrable the situation, the more difficult it is to consciously process and appreciate aspects of
the situation, like a reward/punishment schedule. Understanding the reward/punishment schedule
in a less cognitively penetrable situation should require a higher working memory load and greater
demand on cognitive resources that a situation that is more cognitively penetrable. The more
cognitively penetrable a situation, the easier it should be to consciously process and appreciate its
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structure, including a reward/punishment schedule. Understanding the reward/punishment
schedule in a more cognitively penetrable situation should require a lower working memory load
and less demand on cognitive resources, as the payoff structure is more easily apprehended.
Measuring cognitive penetrability in the SMH literature. Cognitive penetrability has been
measured in the SMH literature by assessing the extent to which the payoff structure of the IGT
has been extracted by and is consciously available to the participants.
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997) provided evidence that participants are not
fully aware of the payoff structure of the IGT, and that somatic markers do not need to be perceived
consciously to have an influence on decision making. The authors conducted an experiment in
which skin conductance responses (SCRs) were measured while participants completed the IGT.
In addition to SCRs, Bechara and colleagues (1997) periodically asked participants what they
knew about what was going on in the task (“Tell me all you know about what is going on in this
game”), and how they felt about the task (“Tell me how you feel about this game”). These
questions were designed to assess if participants could consciously become aware of the task
structure.
Based on the answers to the open-ended questions, the authors proposed four different
periods of performance, from the beginning to the end of the IGT. The first period is a prepunishment period, when participants have yet to experience a punishment. The second period is
a pre-hunch period, when participants have experienced punishment, but they do not know any
more about the decks. The third period is a hunch period, when participants have some notion that
some decks are better or worse. The final period is the conceptual period, when participants know
that there are good and bad decks, and which decks they are.
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In healthy participants, there was an increase in anticipatory SCRs during the pre-hunch
period. This suggests that they were learning to avoid the disadvantageous decks and choose from
the advantageous decks, even though they were in a period defined as not having conscious
knowledge that some decks were better or worse. The increased anticipatory SCR activity
remained throughout the rest of the periods. Roughly 70% of healthy participants were eventually
able to report knowing which decks were the good and bad decks, i.e., they eventually reached the
conceptual period. In participants with vmPFC damage, they never made it to the hunch period,
nor did they develop anticipatory SCRs. The authors concluded that somatic markers can guide
behavior before the participant is consciously aware of the consequences.
Maia and McClelland (2004) challenged the assumption that the IGT was not cognitively
penetrable. Suggesting that the open-ended questions asked by Bechara et al. (1997) were not
sensitive enough to measure conscious knowledge, Maia and McClelland (2004) operationalized
conscious knowledge as verbal knowledge of the advantageous strategy, and identified three levels
of conscious knowledge. Level Zero corresponded to a lack of conscious knowledge regarding a
preference for one of the two best decks, similar to the pre-hunch period (Bechara et al., 1997).
Level One corresponded to conscious knowledge regarding a preference for one of the two best
decks, but a lack of conscious knowledge about the payoff structure that could be the basis for the
preference. This is similar to the hunch period (Bechara et al., 1997). Level Two corresponded to
conscious knowledge regarding preference and payoff structure, similar to the conceptual period
(Bechara et al., 1997).
The questions asked of participants throughout the task were detailed and focused in an
attempt to measure conscious knowledge at each of these levels. For example, Maia and
McClelland (2004) asked quantitative questions regarding conscious knowledge of the expected
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net result, probability of getting a loss, and mean loss value for each deck. A majority of those
who performed advantageously reported generally accurate knowledge about the decks at Level
Two. This evidence suggests that the IGT is a more cognitively penetrable situation than
previously assumed, and there is the potential for cognitive processes in addition to affective
processes to contribute substantially to successful performance.
However, more recent evidence suggests that the questions used by Maia and McClelland
(2004) may have been too probing and subsequently led participants to the correct response (e.g.,
Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007; Reimann & Bechara, 2010). In the study conducted by Persaud
and colleagues (2007), participants played through the IGT. As they played through the IGT, they
were asked to place wagers on the outcomes of their decisions. This was meant to serve as a
behavioral measure of conscious knowledge, because attempting to maximize winnings by placing
the maximum wager (advantageous wagering) was presumed to be indicative of understanding the
task structure. Participants answered either no questions, open-ended questions identical to
Bechara and colleagues (1999), or detailed questions identical to Maia and McClelland (2004).
Participants who were asked no questions or open-ended questions started choosing more from the
advantageous decks before advantageous wagering. Those who were asked detailed questions,
however, started choosing more advantageously at a similar time that they started to wager
advantageously. The authors argued that the more detailed, probing questions used by Maia and
McClelland (2004) led to the development of conscious knowledge about the task.
As the research above suggests, the IGT is not cognitively impenetrable. Instead, it seems
that participants are able to gradually become aware of the reward/punishment schedule by the end
of the task. What this means for the SMH is less clear (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006).
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Manipulating cognitive penetrability in this dissertation. In this dissertation, cognitive
penetrability was manipulated to create situations that would help differentiate between the
cognition-based and emotion-based explanations for how we make risky decisions from
experience.
If the task structure is difficult to consciously comprehend, then it should be harder to rely
on cognitive processes to make decisions. Instead, it will be necessary to rely on affective
processes. This should then yield preferences closer to somatic marker predictions. On the other
hand, if the task structure is easier to consciously comprehend, then it should be easier to rely on
cognitive processes to make decisions. This should then yield preferences closer to probability
weighting predictions.
The cognitive penetrability manipulation was accomplished through changing the
number of outcomes displayed in each trial of the experience task. For the less cognitively
penetrable situation, multiple outcomes were presented on each trial making the
reward/punishment schedule harder to discern. Encoding multiple outcomes requires the use of
more processing capacity, making it more likely there would be insufficient cognitive recourses
available to consciously comprehend task structure. Thus, multiple outcomes should yield a
decrease in cognitive penetrability.
Manipulating cognitive penetrability by changing the number of outcomes displayed was
based in part on the relationship between cognitive penetrability and the similar but distinct
constructs of cognitive load and cognitive cost. Cognitive load is an umbrella term that
represents the cognitive demands associated with performing a given task (e.g., Paas, Tuovinen,
Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003; Paas & van Merrienboer, 1994; Sweller, 1988). According to
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cognitive load theory, failures of learning and of performance on particularly complex tasks can
be attributed to an increase in the cognitive demands required, i.e., an increase in cognitive load
(e.g., Paas et al., 2003). Increases in cognitive demands typically place a strain on working
memory. Classic work by Miller (1956) examined the limits of information processing and the
capacity of working memory, concluding that working memory is generally capable of holding 7
± 2 “chunks" or groups of related information. Based on extensive testing, Simon (1974) and
later Cowan (2001) provided evidence that the capacity of working memory is actually closer to
three to five chunks. The relationship between cognitive load and cognitive penetrability is such
that the greater the cognitive load, the less cognitively penetrable the situation should be. That is,
the more cognitive demands required, the more difficult it should be to rely on cognitive
resources to effectively and accurately assess the situation.
With respect to the cognitive penetrability manipulation, multiple outcomes displayed on
each trial should put more strain on working memory than a single outcome because working
memory is only able to hold so much. Thus, the presentation of multiple outcomes should
increase the cognitive demands required and make it more difficult to rely on cognitive resources
to accurately and effectively process all of the available information.
Cognitive cost is another way of thinking about the demands on limited cognitive
processes, referring to the cost incurred through the use of cognitive processes to perform a given
task. Cognitive cost has been studied in a variety of contexts, including costs incurred from
switching tasks (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and emotion regulation (e.g., Richards & Gross,
2000). Cognitive cost is thought to be high when engaging in more demanding processing; it is
thought to be low when engaging in less demanding processing. The relationship between
cognitive cost and cognitive penetrability is such that the higher the cognitive cost, the less
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cognitively penetrable the situation should be. That is, the more demanding the cognitive
processing, the harder it should be to rely on cognitive resources to effectively and accurately
assess the situation.
Whether the cognitive cost associated with performing a task is high or low likely
depends in part on the complexity of the features of the task itself. Weiss-Cohen and colleagues
(2018) were interested in the influence of task complexity on advantageous decision making. The
authors manipulated task complexity by changing the number of possible options from which to
choose, as well as the number of possible outcomes available in each option. The more options
and outcomes, the more complex the task. They found that task complexity did influence
advantageous decision making. Generally speaking, the more complex the task, the less likely
participants were to make advantageous decisions, suggesting that complexity makes it more
difficult to accurately identify advantageous choices. Furthermore, they found that participants
would rely more heavily on the easier-to-process descriptive information when task complexity
increased. The authors suggested that their findings were due to a higher cognitive cost
associated with processing more complex features of the task.
With respect to the cognitive penetrability manipulation, multiple outcomes displayed on
each trial increases the complexity of the task, and should require engaging in more demanding
processing than a single outcome. Thus, the presentation of multiple outcomes should make it
more costly and demanding to rely on cognitive resources, thereby making it harder to accurately
and effectively process the information. In essence, higher cognitive cost, through increased task
complexity, can be expected to result in lower cognitive penetrability.
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Support for manipulating cognitive penetrability by changing the number of outcomes
displayed came not only from research on cognitive load and cognitive cost, but also from
research on how the IGT was originally designed to be cognitively impenetrable. The IGT uses
multiple outcomes to decrease cognitive penetrability. On several trials of the IGT, a gain is
presented with a simultaneous loss. Moreover, the values of the loss vary, adding to the diversity
of outcomes. I reduced the cognitive penetrability even further than the IGT by making every
trial involve multiple, diverse outcomes, details of which are provided later in the method. This
made the reward/punishment schedule more difficult to consciously comprehend because there
was more to track, increasing the demand on working memory and cognitive processing
resources. As it became difficult to rely on conscious cognitive processes to guide decision
making, people should be more likely to rely on intuitive affective feelings associated with
somatic markers.
For the more cognitively penetrable situation, only one gain or one loss was displayed as
the outcome on each trial, making the schedule easier to comprehend. This is similar to when one
gain or one loss is received in the computerized money machine (CMM) and other experiencebased paradigm tasks.

The reward/punishment schedule should be easier to consciously

comprehend because there were fewer outcomes to track. Fewer outcomes mean less demand on
working memory and cognitive resources. It is then feasible to rely on cognitive processes to guide
decision making.
This leads to the first two sets of hypotheses in this dissertation, which are separated for
equal negative expected value options and equal positive expected value options. To set the stage,
in this dissertation, four options were presented to each participant, similar to the typical IGT (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 1999). Two options had a higher advantageous EV, and the other two had a lower,
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disadvantageous EV, similar to IGT options. However, within each EV, one option was risky with
a highly probable and a rare outcome, and the other was an option with a sure outcome. This risky
versus sure manipulation is similar to common experience-based paradigms like the CMM, as well
as related description tasks (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The first set of hypotheses focuses on preferences in a less cognitively penetrable situation,
predicting that decisions will thus be consistent with the SMH (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005).
Hypothesis 1A: For options with equal negative expected values, preferences should be
risk seeking. As explained by the SMH, an option with a sure loss should yield a stronger
negative somatic marker than an option with a probable loss and a rare chance of gain,
signaling an avoidance strategy for sure-thing options.
Hypothesis 1B: For options with equal positive expected values, preferences should be risk
averse. As explained by the SMH, an option with a sure gain should yield a stronger
positive somatic marker than an option with a probable gain and a rare chance of loss,
signaling an approach strategy for sure-thing options.
The second set of hypotheses focuses on preferences in a more cognitively penetrable
situation, predicting that decisions will be consistent with predictions from experience-based
paradigms in the D-E gap tradition (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
Hypothesis 2A: For options with equal negative expected values, preferences should be
risk averse. As explained by probability weighting, the rare gain in the risky option should
be underweighted, making that option less appealing than the alternative option with a sure,
but smaller magnitude, loss.
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Hypothesis 2B: For options with equal positive expected values, preferences should be risk
seeking. As explained by probability weighting, the rare loss possible in the risky option
will be underweighted, making that option more appealing than the alternative option with
a sure, but smaller magnitude, gain.
A finer test of differences between cognition-based and emotion-based explanations.
The IGT involves the manipulation of two different factors, which allow a finer test of the strength
of potential influences on risky choice. One factor is the long-run expected value (EV) of each
deck. Two of the decks are advantageous, with EVs of $25 per trial, and the other two decks are
disadvantageous with EVs of -$25 per trial. The other factor is frequency of outcomes, wherein
decks with a higher frequency of gains and lower frequency of losses may seem more appealing
than the other decks.
According to the SMH, decision makers can learn about the long-run consequences of
options with help from implicit decision-making processes associated with somatic markers.
Advantageous performance on the IGT by healthy participants was originally believed to be the
result of being sensitive to the future negative consequences of the disadvantageous decks, and
eventually learning to choose from advantageous decks with the help of somatic markers. On the
other hand, disadvantageous performance on the IGT by those with vmPFC damage was initially
characterized as insensitivity to the future negative consequences of the disadvantageous decks, or
myopia for the future (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Those with this type of brain damage were
unable to use somatic markers to help connect the negative feeling of anticipating a potential loss
to the disadvantageous decks. The myopia explanation was supported by Bechara, Tranel, and
Damasio (2000) via two modifications to the IGT. First, the authors tested the possibility that
disadvantageous performance was not due to a myopia for the future, but instead was due to large
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immediate gains outweighing future losses. This alternative explanation was characterized as
hypersensitivity to reward. This was tested using an IGT variant that reversed the
reward/punishment schedule in the original IGT such that the punishments were immediate and
the rewards were delayed. Healthy participants still chose advantageously, and participants with
vmPFC damage still chose disadvantageously. As a result, the authors argued that hypersensitivity
to reward was not a viable explanation.
Next, the authors tested whether disadvantageous performance might be due to future
losses being unable to outweigh any gains. This alternative explanation was characterized as
insensitivity to punishment. It was tested in two ways. The delayed punishments in the original
IGT were increased, and the delayed rewards in the IGT variant were decreased. Again, healthy
participants continued to choose advantageously, and participants with vmPFC damage still chose
disadvantageously. The authors concluded that insensitivity to punishment was not a viable
explanation. Bechara and colleagues concluded that those with vmPFC damage were performing
disadvantageously because they were insensitive to future consequences, and this myopia persisted
despite unfavorable long-term consequences.
Recent evidence suggests that performance on the IGT depends also on frequency of
immediate rewards and punishments. This is supported by observations of healthy participants
preferring disadvantageous Deck B to the other three decks in the IGT (e.g., Buelow, Okdie, &
Blaine, 2013; Caroselli, Hiscock, Scheibel, & Ingram, 2006; Koritzky & Yechiam, 2010; Maia &
McClelland, 2004; Toplak, Jain, & Tannock, 2005; Wilder, Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1998).
Despite the traditional assumption that Deck B is disadvantageous because its infrequent large
future losses lead to an overall loss in the long run, its frequent large immediate gains may make
it seem attractive.
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To explore whether EV or frequency of gains and losses is more important to preferences
in the IGT, the Soochow Gambling Task was developed (SGT; e.g., Chiu, Lin, Huang, Lin, Lee,
& Hsieh, 2008; Lin, Chiu, & Huang, 2009). Chiu and colleagues (2008) created the four decks of
the SGT such that the advantageous decks had lower gain frequency, and the disadvantageous
decks had a higher gain frequency. Healthy participants preferred the decks with the higher
frequency of gains, despite those decks being disadvantageous in the long run, i.e., having a
negative expected value.
Lin and colleagues (2009) further tested the effect of EV by varying outcome while keeping
gain frequency constant. Two modified versions of the SGT were used. Both versions had two
high frequency gain decks and two low frequency gain decks. Within the high frequency and low
frequency decks, one deck had a positive EV and the other deck had a negative EV. The versions
differed in terms of value contrast. The small-value version consisted of four decks with smallvalue gains and losses. On the other hand, the large-value version consisted of four decks with
large-value gains and losses. In both versions, i.e., for small and large values, healthy participants
again preferred the decks with the higher frequency of gains rather than choosing based on EV.
It is not clear whether these results are inconsistent with the SMH. Bechara and Damasio
(2005) argue that frequency of outcomes is important because it helps to determine the strength of
the somatic marker. Specifically, events that are more frequent trigger stronger somatic states than
less frequent events. Thus, with small differences in EV, it would not be surprising to see that both
options (high and low EV) with higher frequency gains may be preferred to both of the lower
frequency options. The extent to which this is true yields information about the relative importance
of frequency as opposed to long-term average outcomes.
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According to both approaches, frequency has an effect on preferences, but not necessarily
in the same way. Within the D-E gap tradition, frequency becomes important in the form of stated
probabilities. Because decision weights are assumed to be assigned to probabilities, the influence
of probability will not be linearly related to the expected frequency of outcomes (e.g., Hertwig &
Erev, 2009). In decisions from experience, low probabilities—or low frequency outcomes--are
expected to be underweighted. Again, assessing the relative impact of outcome frequency
compared to EV will provide information regarding the strength of this weighting tendency when
compared to the long-term average outcome. Therefore, a finer test of the differences between the
cognition-based explanation from the D-E gap tradition and the emotion-based explanation from
the SMH involved observing the direction and strength of the frequency effects relative to the EV
effects.
This leads to the next two sets of hypotheses in this dissertation, which are again separated
for equal negative expected value options and equal positive expected value options.
The third set of hypotheses focus on preferences in a less cognitively penetrable situation,
in which decisions are expected to be in line with somatic marker predictions.
Hypothesis 3A: Within all negative expected value options, frequency and EV are expected
to play a role in determining the most and least preferred options. The advantageous option
with a probable loss should be preferred the most. As explained by the SMH, the option
will yield the weakest negative somatic marker in response to a probable loss rather than a
sure loss and a relatively smaller expected long-term loss. The disadvantageous option with
a sure loss should be preferred the least. As explained by the SMH, the option will yield
the strongest negative somatic marker in response to a sure loss rather than a probable loss
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and a relatively larger expected long-term loss. As for the advantageous option with a sure
loss and the disadvantageous option with a probable loss, whether preferences were based
predominantly on frequency will be explored. For example, the disadvantageous option
with a probable loss might be preferred to the advantageous option because according to
the SMH, the probable loss should yield a weaker negative somatic marker, making it look
more attractive than a sure loss, even if the long-term expected loss is smaller for the sure
loss.
Hypothesis 3B: Within all positive expected value options, frequency and EV are again
expected to play a role in determining the most and least preferred options. The
advantageous option with a sure gain should be preferred the most. As explained by the
SMH, the option will yield the strongest positive somatic marker in response to a higher
gain frequency combined with a relatively higher expected gain. The disadvantageous
option with a probable gain should be preferred the least. As explained by the SMH, the
option will yield the weakest positive somatic marker in response to a higher gain
frequency combined with a relatively lower expected gain. As for the advantageous option
with a probable gain and the disadvantageous option with a sure gain, whether preferences
were based predominantly on frequency will be explored. For example, the
disadvantageous sure option might be preferred to the advantageous probable option
because according to the SMH, the strength of the somatic for the sure gain may be stronger
than the effect of the longer-term lower expected gain, making it seem more attractive than
the probable gain with the higher EV.
The fourth set of hypotheses focus on preferences in a more cognitively penetrable
situation, in which decisions are expected to be in line with probability weighting predictions.
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Hypothesis 4A: Within all negative expected value options, frequency and EV are again
expected to play a role in determining the most and least preferred options. The
advantageous option with a sure loss should be preferred the most, because according to
probability weighting, it has the lowest magnitude loss combined with a relatively smaller
expected long-term loss. The disadvantageous option with a probable loss should be
preferred the least. According to probability weighting, the rare gain will be
underweighted, and combined with a relatively larger expected long-term loss, this makes
the option the least attractive. As for the advantageous option with a probable loss, and the
disadvantageous option with a sure loss, whether preferences were based predominantly
on frequency will be explored. For example, the disadvantageous sure option might be
preferred to the advantageous probable option because according to probability weighting,
the rare gain in the advantageous option is underweighted. This might make the lower
magnitude loss in the disadvantageous option seem more attractive despite its relatively
higher expected long-term loss.
Hypothesis 4B: Within all positive expected value options, EV and frequency are
again expected to play a role in determining the most and least preferred options. The
advantageous option with a probable gain should be preferred the most. As explained by
probability wighting, in this option, the rare loss will be underweighted, and combined with
a relatively higher expected gain, this makes the option the most attractive. The
disadvantageous option with a sure gain should be preferred the least, because according
to probability weighting, it has the highest magnitude gain combined with a relatively
higher expected gain. As for the advantageous sure option and the disadvantageous
probable option, whether preferences were based predominantly on frequency will be
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explored. For example, the disadvantageous probable option might be preferred to the
advantageous sure option because according to probability weighting, the rare loss in the
disadvantageous option is underweighted. This might make the higher magnitude gain in
the disadvantageous option seem more attractive despite its relatively lower expected gain.
Extending the Description-Experience Gap Literature
Decisions made from experience are likely to differ from those made from description.
Although the D-E gap has been widely documented, questions remain about when and why the
differences occur. In this dissertation, I extended the D-E gap literature by exploring whether the
gap generalizes from the D-E gap paradigm to the IGT paradigm, and whether the gap was affected
by the ease of processing options.
Description-experience gap. In several comparisons of description- and experience-based
decisions, robust and systematic differences in risk preferences have been demonstrated (e.g.,
Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev et al., 2009; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In these
comparisons, a choice is often made between a risky option with two outcomes and a sure-thing
option of equal expected value. In the risky option, the desirable outcome occurs with low
probability or high probability. In decisions from description, people tend to be risk averse when
the desirable outcome has a higher probability, and risk seeking when the desirable outcome has a
lower probability. In decisions from experience, the opposite pattern emerges. People tend to be
risk seeking when the desirable outcome has a higher probability, and risk averse when the
desirable outcome has a lower probability. Prospect theory’s reflection effect of risk aversion for
gains and risk seeking for losses is reversed when comparable description gambles are presented
as experience gambles.
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As described previously, these differences are thought to emerge because of differences in
the way in which rare events are weighted relative to their objective probabilities (e.g., Hertwig &
Erev, 2009). In decisions from description, consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), rare events are overweighted and exaggerated in impact. This is potentially because they
remain salient in gambles wherein each outcome is explicitly provided with its respective
probability. In decisions from experience, however, rare events are underweighted and have less
impact. This is potentially because rare outcomes are not often encountered so they remain less
salient (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
Is the D-E gap an artifact? Part of the debate regarding the underlying causes of the D-E
gap is centered on whether or not the underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience
can be explained away by participants’ information search process in the sampling paradigm. In
the sampling paradigm, participants often do not sample much from the options before choosing
the option that they prefer (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). If participants rely
on small samples like this, it is likely that the participant might not experience the rare event at all.
More generally, the participant might under-sample the rare event, which is consistent with the
results from Hertwig and colleagues (2004). Therefore, the probabilities of the outcomes that
participants actually experience might be different than the probabilities of the outcomes only
known to the experimenter (so-called “objective”, or intended, probabilities).
Fox and Hadar (2006) argued that the underweighting of rare events in experience could
be attributed to the difference between experienced frequencies and the underlying objective
probabilities of the payoff structure; that is, due to sampling error. They reanalyzed Hertwig and
colleagues’ (2004) data by reviewing if preferences in the sampling paradigm were consistent with
prospect theory when weights were applied to the probabilities that participants actually
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experienced instead of the objective underlying probabilities. Consistent over all six of the decision
problems in Hertwig and colleagues (2004), participants’ preferences were in conflict with
prospect theory predictions when the analysis was applied to objective probabilities. This is the
typical experience-based finding. However, participants’ preferences conformed to prospect
theory when the analysis was applied to the experienced probabilities, with preference patterns
that looked similar to preference patterns from description. Fox and Hadar (2006) concluded that
the underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience is driven primarily by a tendency
to rely on small samples.
This conclusion from Fox and Hadar (2006) was supported in a study by Glockner, Fiedler,
Hochman, Ayal, and Hilbig (2012). Participants sampled twice as much in their study compared
to those in Hertwig and colleagues’ (2004) study. Consequently, the rare event was appropriately
sampled, such that experienced probabilities generally matched objective underlying probabilities.
No D-E gap in risk preferences was observed, suggesting that when sampling error is minimized
the D-E gap disappears.
In contrast to these findings, though, Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, and Hertwig (2008) provided
evidence suggesting that doubling or tripling the number of times participants sampled reduced,
but did not eliminate, the D-E gap. The D-E gap was also reduced but not eliminated in a sampling
task in which the number of times participants sampled was controlled and experienced
frequencies were made to match objective probabilities (Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009).
The evidence above suggests that minimizing differences between experienced
probabilities and the underlying objective probabilities is important when testing the probability
weighting predictions associated with the D-E gap. Therefore, in this dissertation, participants that

37

make decisions from experience had plenty of trials from which to learn about the outcomes and
probabilities. Trial sequences were made to be representative of their underlying structure such
that participants experienced outcome frequencies that are consistent with objective probabilities.
Extension: Cognitive penetrability. The debate regarding the D-E gap emphasizes the
importance of better understanding when the D-E gap can be expected to occur (e.g., Camilleri &
Newell, 2013). To extend this literature, I explored whether the D-E gap generalized from the
typical D-E gap paradigm to the IGT paradigm that involves more outcomes. I also utilized the
cognitive penetrability manipulation in order to help identify how cognitive processing difficulty
may affect decisions based on description.
In the D-E gap tradition, common experience-based paradigms, as well as description tasks,
are already more cognitively penetrable. That is, the payoff structure is easy to understand because
gains and losses are presented in a less complex fashion, i.e., one gain or one loss is displayed.
Therefore, decisions made in a more cognitively penetrable situation should be in line with
probability weighting predictions associated with the D-E gap (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
On the other hand, common experience-based paradigms, as well as description tasks, are
only studied in the context of more cognitively penetrable situations. In a less cognitively
penetrable situation, the payoff structure in both description and experience should become more
difficult to consciously comprehend. For experience, this difficulty was expected to yield
preferences driven by affective processes as predicted in the SMH. However, for description, there
is no basis for developing a somatic marker from past experience. Therefore, the decision maker
has little to fall back on when comprehending the payoff structure of options becomes difficult.
As a result, prospect theory predictions may hold, but weaken.
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This leads to the final two sets of hypotheses in this dissertation, which are separated for
more and less cognitively penetrable situations.
The fifth set of hypotheses focuses on preferences in a more cognitively penetrable
situation, predicting that decisions will be in line with the originally identified D-E gap (e.g.,
Hertwig & Erev, 2009), assuming that the D-E gap is not simply a product of sampling issues.
Hypothesis 5A: When making decisions from description, prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979) predictions are expected to hold. In accordance with the reflection effect
anticipated due to an S-shaped value function and the overweighting of rare events,
preferences should be risk averse for gains (i.e., positive expected values) but risk seeking
for losses (i.e., negative expected values).
Hypothesis 5B: When making decisions from experience, predictions consistent with
results from other experienced-based paradigms (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009) are expected
to hold. Contrary to prospect theory and in accordance with the underweighting of rare
events, preferences should be risk seeking for gains but risk averse for losses.
The sixth set of hypotheses focuses on preferences in a less cognitively penetrable
situation, predicting that decisions will be different for description and experience, though not
necessarily in line with the D-E gap.
Hypothesis 6A: When making decisions from description, prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979) predictions may hold, but weaken. Outcomes and probabilities are still explicitly
provided, but are displayed in a more complex fashion that potentially makes it harder to process,
with no intuitive or affective feelings to help guide choice. Preferences should then be less risk
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averse for gains and less risk seeking for losses relative to decisions from description in the more
cognitively penetrable condition.
Hypothesis 6B: When making decisions from experience, decisions will be driven
primarily by affective process and are expected to be consistent with typical IGT performance and
the SMH (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). According to the SMH, because sure outcomes trigger
stronger somatic responses than probable outcomes, preferences should be risk averse for gains
but risk seeking for losses.
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Method
Participants
Five hundred and twelve participants were recruited, completed the study, and received
psychology course credit for their participation. Of the 512 participants, 96 participants were later
excluded from analysis. Ninety-one participants were excluded due to their self-reported history
of neurological or psychiatric disease, substance-related disorders, and/or prior head injury. The
purpose and details of the participant screening process are discussed below. The remaining five
participants that were excluded had completed the experience task, but did not sample from all
four decks at least once.
Useable data were provided by 416 participants. This met the minimum number of
participants to be recruited for this experiment, which was 360, with 45 participants per condition.
For analyses based on means, Cohen’s (1992) Power Primer suggests at least 45 participants are
necessary per group to find a medium effect with power = .80 and alpha = .05 with four
independent groups (for tests of 2 x 2 interactions). For analyses using frequencies, a total sample
size of 88 is necessary in order to find a medium effect size with power = .80 and alpha .05 for 1
degree of freedom (a 2 x 2 contingency table).
An online system adopted by the psychology department (SONA) was used to identify and
recruit participants. For individuals to be enrolled, they had to be at least 18 years old and eligible
to access the system. Demographic information was not collected to ensure anonymity of the
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participants, but the sample was likely consistent with undergraduate psychology students, who
are most often female and between 18-24 years old.
Participant screening. Participants had to be comparable to the healthy people without
brain damage used to study typical IGT performance. There is support for using a college student
sample for this purpose (e.g., Buelow & Suhr, 2013; Caroselli et al., 2006; Hinson, Jameson, &
Whitney, 2002; Lin, Song, Chen, Lee, & Chiu, 2013). As a check, participants were asked to selfreport their history of neurological or psychiatric disease, substance-related disorders, and prior
head injury (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000; Brand, Rechnow, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007; Buelow
& Suhr, 2013).
Provided in Table 2 are the questions used to get a self-report of participants’ histories.
Participants were excluded from analysis if they reported “yes” to any of the yes/no questions
(Questions 1-8). Question 1 was included because red and green colors were used to emphasize
gains and losses in the task, and the remaining seven questions were used to measure cognitive
impairments, brain injury and damage, and addictions. Specific questions about frequency and
amount of alcohol consumption (Questions 9-10) were also used to exclude from analysis those
who might not have an official substance abuse disorder diagnosis, but likely would if they saw a
professional. Participants were excluded if they reported drinking 20 drinks or more in one week.
This was measured by multiplying the maximum number of drinks participants report consuming
in a single episode by how frequently they reported drinking in a week. If participants selected an
option that listed two values (e.g., 3 or 4 times a week), the higher frequency was assumed in order
to be more conservative. The “Participants Excluded (N)” column in Table 2 represents the total
number of participants who answered “yes” to each of the yes/no questions, or reported drinking
20 drinks or more in one week.
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Table 2
Participant Screening Questions and Scales
Question

Question Scale

Participants Excluded (N)

1. Are you color blind?

Yes/No

4

2. Are you currently on any
medication that affects your
thinking?

Yes/No

29

3. Have you been diagnosed
with any neurological
problems/abnormalities?

Yes/No

24

4. Do you have a history of
speech/language or cognitive
impairments?

Yes/No

13

5. Are you currently receiving
treatment for psychiatric
disorder or have you ever been
hospitalized for psychiatric
reasons?

Yes/No

37

6. Have you had a head injury
that included a significant loss
of consciousness that lasted
longer than 5 minutes?

Yes/No

12

7. Have you had a major
concussion?

Yes/No

31

8. Have you had an active
substance abuse disorder
diagnosis in the past 3 months?

Yes/No

1

9. During the past year, about
how frequently did you drink
alcohol? Please indicate the
response below which comes
closest to describing your
drinking pattern.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Never
Once or twice during
the year
3 to 6 times per year
7 to 10 times per year
About once a month
2 to 3 times per
month
Once or twice a week
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Question

Question Scale

Participants Excluded (N)

•
•

3 or 4 times a week
5 or more times per
week
10. What is the greatest
• 0 drinks
number of standard alcoholic
• 1 drink
• 2 drinks
drinks (examples) you
• 3 drinks
consumed during a single
• 4 drinks
episode of drinking (e.g., one
• 5 drinks
night) in the past month?
• 6 or more drinks
Note. The “Participants Excluded (N)” column does not sum to the total number of participants
who were excluded based on participant screening, as one participant could have answered “yes”
to multiple questions. Of the ninety-one participants who were excluded due to their self-reported
history, as roughly as 10% of participants answered “yes” to more than one question.
Design
This experiment utilized a 2 x 2 x 2 Cognitive Penetrability x Information Source x Valence
between-subjects factorial design. Cognitive penetrability had two levels, less or more cognitively
penetrable. The less cognitively penetrable version presented two outcomes simultaneously, so as
to make the payoff structure more difficult to consciously comprehend. The more cognitively
penetrable version presented only a single net outcome, so as to make the payoff structure easier
to consciously comprehend. Information source had two levels, description or experience. In
description, both outcomes and their corresponding probabilities were explicitly provided. In
experience, outcomes and probabilities were learned through direct, repeated experience over time.
For experience only, trial block was an additional independent variable. It was a within-subjects
variable. Each of the five blocks consisted of forty trials, for a total of 200 trials. Valence has two
levels, positive or negative expected value of the gambles.
One primary dependent variable corresponded to the typical dependent variable in research
on the D-E gap—a measure of risk-taking behavior (e.g., Erev et al., 2009; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
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The risk-taking measure was defined as how often the riskier options were chosen. For description,
this was indicated by the riskier option that was preferred to play. For experience, this was
indicated by the number of times the riskier options are chosen out of the last forty trials.
Another primary dependent variable corresponded to the typical dependent variable in
research on the SMH—a measure of advantageous decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000).
The advantageous decision-making measure was defined as how often the options with the better
expected value (EV) were chosen. For description, this was indicated by whether a better EV
option was preferred to play. For experience, this was indicated by the number of times the
advantageous options were chosen out of the last forty trials.
Answers to questions asked in Qualtrics and outlined in Table 3 were used to assess
conscious knowledge of the task and to corroborate the cognitive penetrability manipulation.
Answers to questions 1-4 were used to measure how well participants were able to report features
of the reward/punishment schedule. These questions were adapted from the test used to assess
conscious knowledge associated with each deck in the SGT (Chiu et al., 2008), and were designed
to be sensitive enough to measure understanding without being too probing (Persaud et al., 2007).
Answers to questions 5-7 were used to measure impressions of cognitive penetrability. Ratings
were provided via a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from extremely difficult (-3) to extremely
easy (+3).
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Table 3
Questions Used to Assess Conscious Knowledge and Corroborate Cognitive Penetrability
Manipulation
Cognitive Penetrability Question
1. In one play, which option (deck) involves the best possible amount?
2. If you played each option (deck) 100 times, which options (decks) would you expect to give you the
best overall total, on average?
3. In one play, which option (deck) involves the worst possible amount?
4. If you played each option (deck) 100 times, which options (decks) would you expect to give you the
worst overall total, on average?
5. How easy or difficult was it to understand the options (decks)?
6. How easy or difficult was it to understand how often you would win and lose?
7. How easy or difficult was it to understand how much you would win and lose?

Stimuli
The base stimuli consisted of eight hypothetical options. Four options had a positive
expected value, and were collectively termed the positive set. The remaining four options had a
negative expected value, and were collectively termed the negative set. The outcome distributions
of the positive and negative sets are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Base Stimuli of the Positive and Negative Sets
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The left side of Table 4 provides the options in the positive set. There were two long-run
relatively disadvantageous ($25) and advantageous ($40) options. Within the two disadvantageous
and two advantageous options, one option yielded a sure gain. The other option yielded a highfrequency (but not certain) larger gain with a (relatively rare) 20% chance of a loss.
The right side of Table 4 provides the options in the negative set. There were two longrun relatively disadvantageous (-$40) and advantageous (-$25) options. Options yielded either a
sure loss or a high-frequency loss with a rare gain. The outcomes and probabilities were identical
to the positive set, with the exception of opposite signs on the outcomes (i.e., reflections about the
Y-axis).
The base stimuli were similar to a subset of option pairs used by Erev and colleagues (2009)
to demonstrate the D-E gap. In their subset, one option was a two-outcome gamble, with an 80%
chance of a gain (or loss) and a 20% chance of a loss (or gain). This was compared to a sure-thing
gain (or loss). This is similar to the base stimuli, only there were four instead of two options in
order to measure advantageous decision making within the positive and negative sets.
Additionally, a 20% chance of an outcome has previously been classified as rare in D-E gap
research (e.g., Erev et al., 2009; Ludvig & Spetch, 2011).
Experience stimuli. In the experience task, each of the four options from the positive set
or negative set was presented as a deck of cards as is done in the IGT task (see Figure 6). The
outcomes revealed from each card differed based on the cognitive penetrability manipulations.
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Figure 6. Screenshots of the experience version of the positive set. The negative set was identical
except the outcomes were of opposite valence. The screenshot on the left is of the more penetrable
version, the right is of the less penetrable version. In both screenshots, it was the first trial, and
Deck A (corresponding to Deck 1 in Table 4) was selected.
In the more cognitively penetrable version, each card contained outcome information in
the form of a single outcome. So, for instance, as indicated in Table 4, a participant received a
gain of $65 for 8 of every 10 cards in Deck 1 (see left side of Figure 6 for an example of one card
from Deck 1) but they received a loss of $135 on 2 of every 10 cards. Experiencing a single
outcome on each trial is standard in experience-based paradigms used to demonstrate cognitivelybased (probability-weighting) predictions for the D-E gap (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003). In this
case, the payoff structure should have been relatively easy to process and remember.
In the less cognitively penetrable version, each card contained two outcomes
simultaneously. Based on pilot research, three features of the less cognitively penetrable version
were updated to strengthen the cognitive penetrability manipulation. Each of the features appears
to some extent in the original IGT, as the IGT was designed to be cognitively impenetrable, and
these features were exaggerated in the cognitive penetrability manipulation implemented here.
First, the simultaneous multiple outcomes of the less penetrable version used were not in
multiples of five (or any other value). These more varied outcomes should be harder to think about
(e.g., add, subtract, and remember).
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Second, each card in a deck yielded varied net gains or losses. That is, the total amount
won or lost in a given experience trial of each deck was variable, but the average value across ten
trials continued to be the expected value associated with the chosen deck. This way, it should be
harder to determine or remember the average total gains or losses, and to then consciously
distinguish them from the other decks.
Finally, the order of the variable outcomes experienced was reviewed to ensure that
disadvantageous decks initially looked more appealing, and the advantageous decks initially
looked less appealing. In other words, reversal learning was required, in that participants would
have to learn over time to shift preferences from initially appealing decks once they experience
worse outcomes. The need for reversal learning was increased for the less penetrable decks through
the use of variable total gains or losses within each deck. That is, since the total amount won or
lost in a given experience trial was variable, any initial gains experienced in any disadvantageous
decks were larger than the average gain, and any initial losses experienced were smaller than the
average loss. The opposite pattern occurred in any advantageous decks.
Table 5 displays the combined outcomes used on the first 10 cards in each deck for the less
cognitively penetrable version of the positive set for the experience task. The negative set was
identical with the exception of opposite signs on the outcomes. The first ten cards in Table 5
demonstrate the general payoff structure for the remaining forty cards, which were in fixed order
for all participants. For example, the gain and loss average values associated with Deck 1 in the
positive set were $65 and -$135, respectively. Instead of winning a total of $65 in each one of the
eight gain trials, participants won a total of $85 in the first gain trial (Card 1: win $37 and win
$48), $70 (Card 2: win $43 and win $27) in the second gain trial, and so on. An example of what
participants saw when they selected Card 1 from Deck 1 can be seen on the right side of Figure 6.
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In ten trials, these different total gains averaged $65. Instead of losing a total of $135 in each one
of the two loss trials, participants lost a total of $105 in the first loss trial, and $165 in the second
loss trial. These ten cards together illustrate the underlying payoff structure of Deck 1, which yields
an 80% chance to win $65 with a 20% chance to lose $135, as indicated in Table 4.
Table 5
Less Cognitively Penetrable Version of the Positive Set (Experience Task)

Although only the first 10 cards are shown in Table 5, a total of forty cards in fixed order
with outcomes representative of the payoff structures were available for each of the four decks. If
all forty cards were selected from one deck, the sequence repeated itself. This was also true in the
more cognitively penetrable conditions, although the outcome for each trial was the single value
corresponding to the gain and loss average values in the less cognitively penetrable conditions.
Description stimuli. Options in the description task were presented as a positive or
negative set of four options consistent with Table 4. As in other studies of the D-E gap, the form
of the descriptions were modeled after those that appear in classic studies of risky choice (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). That is, each possible outcome was explicitly presented with its
corresponding probability; i.e., the payoff structure was fully described.
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In the more penetrable version, outcomes were listed in their net form, with a single
outcome for the associated probability. In the less penetrable version, two outcomes representative
of those shown in Table 5 were presented with each associated probability. Again, the negative set
is identical to the positive set, with the exception of opposite signs on outcomes.
Figure 7 displays an example of a less cognitively penetrable version of options for the
positive set, in the context of the description task.

Figure 7. A description of the less cognitively penetrable option of the positive set.

Procedure
Sessions were randomly counterbalanced to involve a description or experience task.
Within each session, participants were randomly assigned to the less or more cognitively
penetrable version of the positive or negative set.
Participants came into the laboratory and were given free choice in seating. The laboratory
was equipped with eleven desktop computers, allowing for multiple people to participate at the
same time. The researcher obtained verbal consent to participate and delivered either the
description or the experience task instructions. Specific to the description task sessions,
participants were told that a series of four risky choice options would be presented on the computer,
and that they would be asked on each trial to indicate which of the four options they preferred to
play and how the options compare to one another. Specific to the experience task sessions,
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participants were told that four decks of cards representing risky choice options would be presented
on the computer, and that they would be asked on each of a series of trials to indicate from which
deck they would prefer to select a card. They were told that selecting a card would result in some
sort of payoff from that deck, and the payoff would be presented on the card as displayed by the
computer. In both the description and experience task sessions, examples of the task were
provided. Additionally, all participants were told that their goal was to obtain the highest amount
of money possible, or avoid losing as much money as possible.
Following the instructions, participants began the self-administered part of the session.
They were not told exactly how many trials they would complete in the self-administered part of
the session, in order to avoid a change in risk preferences as a function of being close to the end
of the session (i.e., ‘end-of-task’ effect).
If participants were in a description task session, they first indicated their preferences, in
the form of which of the four options they prefer, in the critical positive or negative set. Then, they
indicated their preferences in several sham trials, again for the four options in the critical set, and
for several more sham trials.
If participants were in an experience task session, they indicated their preferences for the
four decks in the positive or negative set. This was done over 200 trials, so that, to the extent that
they could learn about the outcomes and probabilities associated with each deck, participants had
adequate time to do so (e.g., Bull, Tippet, & Addis, 2015). On any given trial, they selected a deck
that they preferred to play. They received a payoff from that deck, and the net increase or decrease
was incorporated into a running total (which started at 0).

52

After participants completed the description or experience task, they answered items
assessing conscious knowledge of the options. Finally, they were asked to self-report their
neurological history. The computer then indicated that the session had ended. Participants were
then instructed to see the researcher for an information sheet, after which they were dismissed from
the laboratory.
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Results
The analysis focused on an examination of how information source, cognitive penetrability,
and valence influenced advantageous decision making and risk taking. First, the effectiveness of
the cognitive penetrability manipulation was assessed. Next, initial analyses of decisions from
experience were conducted on group means to compare the probability weighting and somatic
marker predictions in more and less cognitively penetrable situations. Due to large variation in
preferences across participants, preferences at the individual level were also explored in order to
provide a more thorough comparison of predictions. Finally, evidence of the descriptionexperience gap was assessed across more and less cognitively penetrable situations.
Effectiveness of the Cognitive Penetrability Manipulation
Before conducting any analyses, data were reviewed to verify that the cognitive
penetrability manipulation was functioning as expected. In a more cognitively penetrable situation,
there should have been less demand on working memory and cognitive resources, making the
reward/punishment schedule easier to comprehend. The opposite should have been the case in a
less cognitively penetrable situation. Questions that were used to measure how well the cognitive
penetrability manipulation was functioning were asked after the description or experience task was
completed.
Objective measures of accuracy. To evaluate the effect of cognitive penetrability and task
on how accurately participants reported objective features of the reinforcement schedule, a 2 x 2
Cognitive Penetrability (more or less) x Information Source (description or experience) between-
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subjects ANOVA was conducted. See Table B1 in Appendix B for the complete ANOVA model
table.
Four questions were used to measure accuracy, and they reflected participants’ abilities to
learn from their options. Two of the questions referenced a single play. One question asked which
option (deck) involved the worst possible amount, and the other asked about the best possible
amount. The last two questions referenced repeated play, i.e., playing 100 times. One question
asked which option (deck) would be expected to give the worst over total, and the other asked
about the best overall total.
The dependent variable was the number of questions correct out of four, i.e., an overall
accuracy score. For Questions 1 and 2, there was only one correct answer, and participants were
considered to have answered those questions correctly if they reported the appropriate option. For
Questions 3 and 4, there were two correct answers: the two disadvantageous options yielded the
same worst overall total, and the two advantageous options yielded the same best overall total,
respectively. Participants were considered to have answered those correctly if they reported either
appropriate option or both options.
The main purpose of the analysis was to test for differences in accuracy between the more
and less penetrable versions, in order to see if the cognitive penetrability manipulation was
working as expected. If the cognitive penetrability manipulation was working appropriately, then
those in the more penetrable version should have been better able to learn the features of the
reward/punishment schedule, and then be more likely to correctly report them when asked,
compared to those in the less penetrable version. Cognitive penetrability did in fact have a small
effect on how well participants were able to correctly identify features of the reward/punishment
schedule, F(1,412)=16.22, p<.001, partial η²=.04. As predicted, those in the more penetrable
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version (M=2.87, SE=0.07) were more accurate than those in the less penetrable version (M=2.48,
SE=0.07), on average.
A secondary purpose of the analysis was to test for differences in accuracy between
information source. Description and experience differ in terms of how information is presented
and acquired. In description, outcome and probability information is explicitly provided. In
experience, outcome and probability information is initially unknown and learned over time.
Therefore, regardless of the cognitive penetrability manipulation, participants were likely to be
better able to learn and correctly report the features of the reinforcement schedule in description
than experience. This is because correctly reporting outcome and probability information is
inherently easier to do (i.e., requires fewer cognitive resources) when the information is available
directly rather than having to be generated based on memories of past experiences with the options.
As expected, information source did have a small effect on accurate reporting of the
reinforcement schedule, F(1,412)=19.96, p<.001, partial η²=.05. Those who made decisions from
description (M=2.89, SE=0.07) were more accurate than those who made decisions from
experience (M=2.46, SE=0.07). Information source did not interact with cognitive penetrability to
influence accuracy, F(1,412)=1.85, p=.18. These results are consistent with the proposition that
description is more cognitively penetrable than experience, and this difference is independent of
the manipulation of penetrability.
Based on the evidence from studying accuracy, there is support for the effectiveness of the
cognitive penetrability manipulation. Objective features of the reinforcement schedule were at
least somewhat more likely to be correctly reported in the more penetrable compared to the less
penetrable version, suggesting that the outcome and probability information was easier to
comprehend in the more penetrable version.
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Subjective impressions of penetrability. To evaluate the effect of task and cognitive
penetrability on how participants felt about how well they could learn the reward/punishment
schedule, a 2 x 2 Cognitive Penetrability (more or less) x Information Source (description or
experience) MANOVA was conducted. See Table B2 in Appendix B for the complete summary
ANOVA model table. Three questions were used to measure impressions. The three questions
were: “How easy or difficult was it to understand 1) how much you would win or lose?, 2) how
often you would win or lose?, and 3) the options (decks)? Ratings were provided via a 7-point
Likert-type scale, ranging from extremely difficult (-3) to extremely easy (+3).
If the cognitive penetrability manipulation was functioning as expected, then the
reinforcement schedule should have been easier to comprehend in the more versus less penetrable
version, and participants should have had the impression that it was in fact easier. This was
confirmed by the effect of cognitive penetrability on impressions, F(3,410)=12.50, p<.001, partial
η²=.33.
Follow-up tests revealed that there was an effect of cognitive penetrability on both
understanding how much would be won or lost, F(1,412)=28.72, p<.001, partial η²=.07, and on
general understanding of the options, F(1,412)=4.09, p<.05, partial η²=.01. Regardless of task,
those in the less penetrable version generally rated the options as barely easy to understand
(M=0.62, SE=0.11), but those in the more penetrable version generally rated the options as slightly
easy to understand (M=1.46, SE=0.11). It is not surprising that participants felt that it was easier
to understand how much they won or lost in the more compared to the less penetrable version, as
cognitive penetrability was manipulated by increasing or decreasing the amount and complexity
of the outcomes presented. The effect of cognitive penetrability on general understanding was
roughly the same as on understanding how much, though weaker. Those in the less penetrable
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version generally rated the options as barely easy to understand in general (M=0.73, SE=0.12),
whereas those in the more penetrable version generally rated the options as slightly easy to
understand (M=1.06, SE=0.11).
There was no main effect of cognitive penetrability on understanding how often one might
win or lose, F<1. ,This seems likely because the cognitive penetrability manipulation did not
involve a change in the actual frequency of outcomes or the way in which probabilities were
communicated. Most participants in the less penetrable (M=0.87, SE=.11) and more penetrable
(M=1.02, SE=.11) versions rated the options as slightly easy to understand how often they won or
lost.
Differences in impressions based on information source were also expected. This is
because those in description could see the potential outcomes and probabilities when making
choices and reporting objective features of the payoff structure. Thus, fewer cognitive resources
should be required for choice, which should feel easier than learning the payoff structure over time
as in experience. This effect of information source on impressions was indeed found,
F(3,410)=19.28, p<.001, partial η²=.12.
Follow-up tests revealed that there were effects of information source on all three
questions: understanding how much, F(1,412)=29.29, p<.001, partial η²=.07; understanding how
often, F(1,412)=56.50, p<.001, partial η²=.12; and general understanding, F(1,412)=32.05,
p<.001, partial η²=.07. Averaging over penetrability levels, those in the experience task generally
rated the decks as barely easy to understand when asked about how much (M=0.61, SE=0.11),
how often (M=0.36, SE=0.11), and general understanding (M=0.44, SE=0.12). Those in the
description task generally rated the options as slightly or moderately easy to understand (M=1.46,
SE=0.11; M=1.53, SE=0.11; and M=1.35, SE=0.11, respectively). In description, outcome (how
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much) and probability (how often) information was explicitly provided. In experience, these two
features of the payoff structure were initially unknown and had to be learned. Therefore, it makes
sense that it would feel easier to understand these features in description compared to experience,
and these feelings likely contributed to general understanding.
Information source and cognitive penetrability interacted to influence impressions,
F(3,410)=6.58, p<.001, partial η²=.05. Follow-up tests revealed that the only significant interaction
was between information source and cognitive penetrability on understanding how much was won
or lost, F(1,412)=13.36, p<.001, partial η²=.03. The interaction qualifies the previous main effects
of cognitive penetrability and information source on understanding how much, and was likely
significant because the cognitive penetrability manipulation focused specifically on the amount
and complexity of the outcomes presented. Confirmed by simple effects analyses, the difference
in perceived difficulty between more and less penetrable groups was substantial in the experience
task, F(1,412)=40.06, p<.001, partial η²=.09. That is, in a situation in which outcome information
was initially unknown, the cognitive penetrability manipulation had a substantial effect on
impression of perceived difficulty. In description, however, the difference in perceived difficulty
between penetrability groups was not significant, F(1,412)=1.47, p=.23. Thus, in a situation in
which outcome information was readily available, the cognitive penetrability did not seem to have
an effect on perceived difficulty regarding how much would be won or lost.
Based on the evidence from studying impressions, there is additional support for the
effectiveness of the cognitive penetrability manipulation. Participants generally felt that the
options were easier to understand, particularly how much one won or lost, in the more penetrable
compared to the less penetrable version.
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Summary. The cognitive penetrability manipulation was designed to make it harder to
discern the payoff structure of the options (decks) in the less penetrable relative to the more
penetrable version. Based on the evidence from studying accuracy and impressions, the
manipulation was largely effective. Those in the less penetrable version were less likely to
correctly report objective features of the options, and generally felt that the options were less easy
to understand, than those in the more penetrable version.
In addition to support for the effectiveness of the cognitive penetrability manipulation,
results from studying accuracy and impressions suggest that description may be more cognitively
penetrable than experience. The obvious reason is that those in description had the relevant
information right in front of them when reporting objective features of the options, likely requiring
fewer cognitive resources, making it feel easier to understand the options.
Comparing Probability Weighting and Somatic Marker Predictions in Experience
Comparing mean preferences. To identify the overall effects of cognitive penetrability
and valence on decisions from experience, mean preferences in the experience task were analyzed
across groups to compare the probability weighting and somatic marker predictions within more
and less cognitively penetrable situations.
Two separate analyses were conducted because of the nature of the dependent variable.
The dependent variable, decision making, was measured by how many times one of the four decks
was chosen out of the last forty trials. However, including all four decks in one analysis would
have constrained the dependent variable to sum to forty. Therefore, the dependent variable of
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decision making was broken down into two types—choices for the advantageous decks and
choices for the risky decks. This yielded two separate analyses of the experience data.1
The effect of risk on advantageous decision making. In accordance with the SMH
literature, healthy participants without brain impairment or damage should generally perform
advantageously. Those presented with the positive set (all options had a positive expected value,
or EV) should prefer the options with the larger positive EV. Those presented with the negative
set (all options had a negative EV) should prefer the options with a smaller negative EV.
In the current research, participant screening methods described earlier were used to ensure
that all participants met established health-related criteria. In addition, before the comparative
analysis, a check was conducted to verify that participants were in fact generally performing
advantageously. Two single-sample t-tests confirmed that those in both the more penetrable
version (M=28.86, SD=8.65; t(112)=10.89, p<.001) and the less penetrable version (M=25.58,
SD=8.09; t(92)=6.65, p<.001) generally chose the advantageous deck more than half of the time
in the last forty trials. That is, both groups generally performed advantageously by the end.
To isolate the advantageous choices and explore the effect of risk, a 2 x 2 x 2 Cognitive
Penetrability (more or less) x Valence (positive or negative) x Riskiness (sure-thing or risk) mixed
factorial ANOVA was conducted. See Table B3 in Appendix B for the complete ANOVA model
table. The dependent variable of advantageous decision making, measured by the number of times
one of the two advantageous (i.e., higher EV) decks was chosen out of the last forty trials.

1

Data from these two analyses (ANOVAs) were reviewed to verify that assumptions related to underlying
distributions were met. There was a minor violation of the normality assumption, but with ANOVA generally being
robust to minor violations, the two separate ANOVAs were conducted as planned. See Appendix A for a discussion
of the testing of the normality assumption.
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It was expected that a main effect of cognitive penetrability would be found, with those in
the more penetrable version making more advantageous choices on average than those in the less
penetrable version because of the potential for both somatic markers and the opportunity to
consciously comprehend the reward structure to assist in decision making. A small main effect of
cognitive penetrability was indeed found, F(1,202)=7.79, p<.01, partial η²=.04. As expected,
averaged across risky and sure-thing choices, those in the more penetrable version (M=14.43,
SE=0.40) chose an advantageous deck slightly more often than those in the less penetrable version
(M=12.78, SE=0.44).
There was no main effect of valence, F<1. The valence of outcomes did not seem to
influence whether participants were generally able to perform advantageously. Those who saw
the negative set (M=13.79, SE=0.42) made about the same number of advantageous choices as
those who saw the positive set (M=13.41, SE=0.41).
Regarding risk taking, there was a small main effect of riskiness, F(1,202)=6.34, p<.05,
partial η²=.04. Generally, participants chose the sure-thing advantageous deck (M=15.34,
SE=0.80) slightly more often than the risky advantageous deck (M=11.86, SE=0.71). However,
the crucial test of the hypotheses regarding risk taking was the Cognitive Penetrability x Valence
x Riskiness interaction. In the less penetrable version, it was expected that risky decks would be
chosen more often in the negative set than in the positive set because of somatic marker predictions
(Hypotheses 1A and 1B). The opposite pattern was expected in the more penetrable version
because of probability weighting (Hypotheses 2A and 2B). This combined pattern was not
observed, as shown in Figure 8. Though potentially somewhat underpowered, the three-way
interaction was not significant, F<1. In fact, cognitive penetrability did not interact with either
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valence or riskiness, Fs<1. Thus, the primary influence of cognitive penetrability was on
advantageous decision making in general, regardless of valence or option riskiness.

Figure 8. Graph of the combined effects of Cognitive Penetrability, Valence, and Riskiness on
advantageous decision making. Standard error bars are shown.
At the same time, there was an additional influence of riskiness that did not involve
cognitive penetrability. The Valence x Riskiness interaction, which is shown in Figure 9, was
significant, F(1,202)=13.58, p<.001, partial η²=.06, and qualified the main effect findings. An
analysis of simple effects was used to explore the nature of the interaction. Those viewing the
positive decks did generally have a shared preference; they substantially preferred the sure-thing
to the risky advantageous deck, F(1,202)=19.60, p<.001, partial η²=.09. This pattern matched
predictions based on the role of somatic markers, and was contrary to gap predictions based on
probability weighting. However, there was not clear support for either set of predictions in the
negative domain. Those viewing the negative decks did not seem to have a strong shared
preference on average for either the risky or the sure-thing advantageous decks, F<1.
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Figure 9. Graph of observed results for the Valence x Riskiness interaction on advantageous
decision making. Standard error bars are shown.
In summary, cognitive penetrability had an influence on advantageous decision making in
general, with those in the easier-to-comprehend situation making slightly more advantageous
choices than those in the harder-to-comprehend situation. This behavioral data supports the
conclusion made from the tests of the effectiveness of the cognitive penetrability manipulation—
that cognitive penetrability had a particular effect on the ability to correctly report which options
were best in the long run, or had the better expected value. However, there were no discernible
differences based on cognitive penetrability in how valence and risk interacted to inform
advantageous decision making. Instead, in the positive domain, overall risk preferences followed
somatic marker predictions and were opposite of probability weighting predictions. However, in
the negative domain, neither set of predictions was supported as average preferences were similar
for the sure thing and risky options. These findings in the negative domain are somewhat
ambiguous. They could have been the result of participants typically not having a preference for
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the sure thing or the risk, or of participants being in disagreement with each other regarding which
decks were preferred. These two possibilities will be explored in a later analysis of individual
differences.
The effect of expected value on preferences for the risky alternatives. To isolate
preferences for the risky option and explore the effect of expected value, a 2 x 2 x 2 Cognitive
Penetrability (more or less) x Valence (positive or negative) x EV (advantageous or
disadvantageous) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. See Table B4 in Appendix B for the
complete ANOVA model table. The dependent variable was preference for the risky options,
measured by the number of times one of the two risky decks (either advantageous or
disadvantageous) was chosen out of the last forty trials.
Findings from this analysis tell a story compatible with the analysis that isolated
advantageous choices. First, as before, cognitive penetrability did not have an effect on preferences
for the risky alternative over the sure thing alternative. This was evidenced by the lack of a main
effect of cognitive penetrability on risk taking, with participants in both the more (M=9.51,
SE=0.51) and less (M=9.57, SE=0.56) penetrable versions generally choosing a risky deck just
less than half of the time, F<1. At the same time, valence had a medium-sized effect on risk taking,
F(1,202)=26.82, p<.001, partial η²=.12. When averaged across advantageous and disadvantageous
choices, those in the negative domain (M=11.50, SE=0.54) chose a risky deck more often than
those in the positive (M=7.58, SE=0.54).
The influence of cognitive penetrability on choosing the advantageous deck was also seen.
There was a medium-sized main effect of EV, F(1,202)=29.99, p<.001, partial η²=.13. The risky
advantageous deck (M=11.86, SE=0.71) was chosen more often than the risky disadvantageous

65

deck (M=7.22, SE=0.39), providing corroboration that participants were generally performing
advantageously by the end. The main effect of EV was qualified by a small yet significant
Cognitive Penetrability x EV interaction, F(1,202)=5.75, p<.05, partial η²=.03. As shown in Figure
10, it appears that the risky advantageous deck was chosen slightly more often than the risky
disadvantageous deck on average, regardless of cognitive penetrability. However, as suggested by
simple effects analysis, the pattern was stronger for the more penetrable version, F(1,202)=34.23,
p<.001, partial η²=.16, than the less penetrable version, F(1,202)=4.33, p<.05, partial η²=.02. This
pattern was expected, given the main effect of cognitive penetrability found in the analysis
isolating advantageous choices.

Figure 10. Graph of observed results for the Cognitive Penetrability x EV interaction on risky
decision making. Standard error bars are shown.
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Valence did not interact with EV, F(1,202)=3.37, p=.07. In both the positive and negative
domains, the risky advantageous deck was chosen more often than the risky disadvantageous deck.
Cognitive penetrability did not interact with valence, F<1, nor did it interact with valence and EV,
F(1,202)=1.18, p=.28, to influence preferences for risky decks.
Summary. Demonstrated in the analyses comparing mean preferences, cognitive
penetrability primarily influenced advantageous decision making. Participants made more
advantageous choices when it was easier versus harder to comprehend the reinforcement schedule.
Cognitive penetrability did not directly influence risky decision making.
As highlighted in the analysis isolating advantageous choices, mean risk preferences
followed somatic marker predictions in the positive domain, but not in the negative domain. In
fact, in the negative domain, neither somatic markers nor probability weighting predictions were
supported. Average preferences in the negative domain were similar for the sure thing and risky
advantageous decks. To get a sense of what was actually happening in the negative domain and
more thoroughly compare predictions, a closer look was taken at individual differences in
preferences.
Comparing individual preferences. Variation in preferences is common even when using
healthy participants without brain impairment or damage. When comparing mean preferences, this
variation in preferences at the individual level can be disguised. Interpretation might have been
particularly difficult in the negative domain when comparing mean preferences because of
variation in preferences at the individual level.
To get an initial sense of the degree to which there was variation in preferences across
participants at the end of the experience task, the number of times that each of the four decks was
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chosen in the last forty trials was computed for each participant. Summary statistics were organized
by between-subjects group, and can be seen in Appendix A. There was high variability in
preferences across participants in all four between-subjects groups, reflected in the large standard
deviations (relative to the means), particularly for the advantageous decks. This reinforced the
need to examine preferences at the individual level in addition to the group level (e.g., Bull et al.,
2015; Dunn et al., 2006; Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2013).
An additional purpose of examining preferences at the individual level was to conduct a
finer test of the differences between probability weighting and somatic marker predictions. The
finer test involved observing the direction and strength of the frequency effects relative to the EV
effects. Specifically, the extent to which preferences were based on the advantageous or
disadvantageous nature (EV) of the deck versus frequency of outcomes in the deck (risky options
with highly probable and rare outcomes or sure things) was qualitatively explored. Given the
variation, this was explored at the individual and not the group level.
Data were organized separately for those who saw the positive set and those who saw the
negative set, facilitating the direct comparison of individual preferences within and between the
positive and negative sets. In both cases, data were collapsed across cognitive penetrability
conditions. This was done after a review of the breakdown of individual preferences by cognitive
penetrability revealed few differences between the less and more penetrable versions.
General preferences at the individual level. Preferences at the individual level were first
explored using a criterion based on one often used in IGT literature (e.g., Bull et al., 2015) and gap
literature (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003). In both, participants were deemed as having a “preference”
for types of decks if they chose it more than half of the time. In the current research, a participant
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was considered to have a general preference for risky (or sure thing) decks if they chose them 21
times or more out of the last 40 trials. Participants who chose decks exactly 20 times were
considered to have no general preference. The same criterion was applied to general preferences
for advantageous or disadvantageous decks. The resulting pair of 3 x 3 matrices is presented in
Table 6.
When considering general risk preferences at the individual level, preferences in the
positive domain were largely consistent with analyses comparing mean preferences. That is,
patterns again matched those predicted by somatic markers. As shown on the left side of Table 6,
63% of participants had a general preference for sure-thing decks (summing across EV). However,
there were also 29% who tended to favor the risky option, suggesting that the majority was not as
large as it might have been.
Table 6
General Individual Preferences by EV and Risk, in the Positive and Negative Sets

When shifting to the negative domain as seen on the right side of Table 6, a new pattern is
observed. In contrast to the conclusions from the group analysis isolating advantageous choices,
an analysis of individual differences suggests that most of those in the negative domain had
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preference tendencies that were supportive of somatic marker predictions. Over half of the
participants-- 61%--had at least some tendency to choose the risky decks more often than the sure
thing decks. However, almost one third disagreed with the majority in their preference tendencies,
opting more often for one of the sure thing decks.
In the group analysis, it was unclear whether average preferences were similar for the sure
thing and risky advantageous decks in the negative domain, either because participants typically
did not have a preference, or because participants were in disagreement with each other regarding
which decks were preferred. The individual analysis revealed that, though more than half of
participants in the negative domain had a general preference for risky decks, supporting somatic
marker predictions, a substantial minority (32%) had a general preference for sure thing decks.
However, this level of disagreement was also present in the positive domain, which was surprising
given the support for somatic marker predictions in the positive domain based on mean preference
comparisons. Though almost two-thirds of participants in the positive domain had a general
preference for sure thing decks, 29% had a general preference for risky decks. Therefore, in both
domains, there was support for somatic marker predictions in based on general risk preferences
for the majority of participants. However, support was weakened in both domains by the
disagreement, wherein probability weighting would have been more consistent with observed
preference patterns.
When focusing on tendencies toward advantageous preferences at the individual level,
preferences in the positive and negative domains again were consistent with what would be
expected of healthy decision makers. Participants typically made advantageous choices, especially
in the negative domain. As shown in Table 6, 68% of participants who saw the positive set, and
84% of participants who saw the negative set, had a general preference for advantageous decks
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(summing across riskiness). This difference confirmed that even at the individual level, fewer
participants predominantly chose advantageous decks in the positive versus negative domain,
χ2(1)=7.14, p<.01. Thus, a larger majority gravitated toward advantageous decks in the negative
domain compared to the positive domain.
Though a review of general preferences at the individual level yielded support primarily
for somatic marker predictions, it did not fully resolve how risk preferences differed between the
positive and negative domain. In terms of risk preferences, the majority of participants behaved
more consistently with somatic marker predictions, but there was a substantial minority who
behaved more consistently with the probability weighting predictions. Though this might have
been anticipated in the negative domain given the results of the group analysis, this turned out to
be the case in both the positive and negative domains. In terms of advantageous preferences, most
participants made advantageous choices, particularly in the negative versus positive domain.
Strength of preferences at the individual level. In an attempt to better understand the
nuances of how risk preferences differed between the positive and negative domain, preferences
at the individual level were measured using a more stringent criterion than previously used. Instead
of defining preference as choosing a deck more than half of the time, a binomial z-test ( = .05)
was conducted to try to isolate those who had systematic preferences by identifying whether
participants chose a deck significantly more or less than half of the time, which will be referred to
here as a strong preference. This allowed for differentiation between those with clear preferences
and those who might have shown weak patterns that might not represent an intention to choose in
a particular way.
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The critical upper-bound value was 26.20 times and the critical lower-bound value was
13.80 times, out of the last 40 trials. Therefore, in the current research, if a participant chose risky
decks 27 times or more, they were considered to have a strong risk preference. If a participant
chose risky decks 13 times or less, they were considered to have a strong sure thing preference.
Otherwise, participants were considered to have no convincing preference. This included those
who did not reach the critical upper or lower-bound values but still chose decks more or less than
20 times, and those who chose decks exactly 20 times. The same criterion was applied to
preferences for advantageous or disadvantageous decks.
When considering the strength of risk preferences at the individual level, as shown on the
left side of Table 7, almost half of the participants in the positive domain had a strong sure thing
preference (46%). Not only that, about one third (32%) of participants developed a strong
preference for the sure thing advantageous deck, and there was a lack of consensus in popularity
for the other three alternatives.
Table 7
Strength of Individual Preferences by EV and Risk, in the Positive and Negative Sets
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In the negative domain, however, only 29% had a strong preference for the risk, and almost
60% had no convincing preference for either the risk or sure thing. This was shown on the right
side of Table 7. Only 16% of participants had a strong preference for the risky advantageous deck,
with almost as many (12%) having a strong preference for the sure thing advantageous deck. The
largest single group of participants (39%) did not have a convincing preference for any deck,
regardless of EV or riskiness. Thus, a substantial group of participants in the positive domain was
able to develop a clear and strong preference based on the frequency of outcomes, and this
preference lined up with somatic marker predictions. This was not the case in the negative domain.
When focusing on strong advantageous preferences at the individual level, the same
proportion of those in the positive domain and those in the negative domain—47%—had a strong
advantageous preference. Noticeably, 5% of participants had a strong disadvantageous preference
in the positive domain, but no one had a strong disadvantageous preference in the negative domain.
These results, along with the review of general advantageous preferences, suggest that the
tendency to gravitate to the advantageous decks was more likely in the negative than positive
domain, but it did not necessarily result in more people having strong advantageous preferences.
This was not the case for those in the negative domain. Even if participants did not develop a
strong preference for advantageous decks, more participants than those in the positive domain had
a better sense at all of which decks were advantageous, and without exception they avoided
developing a strong preference for the disadvantageous decks.
Considering specific predictions regarding the popularity of decks, it was predicted that the
sure thing advantageous deck would be preferred the most in the positive domain, but only in the
less penetrable version (Hypothesis 3B). In the more penetrable version, the risky advantageous
deck was expected to be preferred the most (Hypothesis 4B). Although not shown here, the
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plurality of participants had a strong preference for the sure thing advantageous deck independent
of cognitive penetrability (31% for less penetrable and 33% for more penetrable). In other words,
for the plurality of participants in the positive domain, preferences were based on both EV of the
deck and frequency of outcomes in the deck. The preference for the sure thing versus the risk
within advantageous decks suggests that the popularity of decks was determined primarily by
frequency of outcomes.
The risky disadvantageous deck was expected to be preferred the least in the less penetrable
version (Hypothesis 3B), and the sure thing disadvantageous deck was expected to be preferred
the least in the more penetrable version (Hypothesis 4B). However, there was little difference
between how many participants strongly preferred the risky and sure thing disadvantageous decks
as disadvantageous decks were rarely preferred regardless of cognitive penetrability.
In the negative domain, the risky advantageous deck was expected to be preferred the most
and the sure thing disadvantageous deck was expected to be preferred the least in the less
penetrable version (Hypothesis 3A). The opposite was expected in the more penetrable version
(Hypothesis 4A). Independent of cognitive penetrability, the plurality of participants in the
negative domain did not have a convincing preference for a particular deck (35% for less
penetrable and 42% for more penetrable), providing little support for either hypothesis that one
deck would be strongly preferred to another. What was clear was that the disadvantageous decks,
regardless of risk, were preferred the least, as zero participants had a strong disadvantageous
preference. Thus, for the plurality of participants in the negative domain, preferences were based
primarily on EV of the deck.
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Summary. Consistent with analyses comparing mean preferences, comparing individual
preferences in experience yielded support primarily for somatic marker predictions. However,
support for somatic marker predictions differed as a function of valence. When considering risk
preferences, participants in the positive domain often preferred the sure thing to the risky
advantageous deck. However, participants in the negative domain often did not have a convincing
preference for the risky advantageous deck. Thus, support for somatic marker predictions was
stronger in the positive domain. When considering advantageous preferences, more participants
were able to pick up on which decks were advantageous in the negative than positive domain. In
this case, support for somatic marker predictions was stronger in the negative domain. These
results suggest that there might be some asymmetries in the mechanisms across the positive and
negative domains.
Testing for the Description-Experience (D-E) Gap
As noted earlier, risky decisions from experience have been found to differ from those
made from description, and these differences have been termed the description-experience (D-E)
gap (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev et al., 2009; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In
an attempt to extend the D-E gap literature to more complex situations, analyses were conducted
in order to assess evidence of the D-E gap across more and less cognitively penetrable situations.
In the D-E gap tradition, in both the standard description and experience tasks, participants
often choose between two options with only one gain or one loss displayed at a time. The standard
tasks are less complex than the tasks used in the current research. In the current research, the more
penetrable version also only displayed one gain or loss, but had participants choosing between four
options instead of two options. The less penetrable version had participants choosing between four
options with multiple gains or losses displayed. So, not only are the standard tasks less complex
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than the tasks used in the current research, but they are technically less complex than even the
more penetrable version.
The first analysis identified whether the D-E gap could be replicated in the more penetrable
version. Despite the fact that the more penetrable version was technically more complex than the
standard tasks, the D-E gap was expected to be replicated because probability weighting
predictions should hold in a situation in which the reward/punishment schedule was easier to
comprehend. The second analysis explored whether the D-E gap could be found in a situation that
made the schedule even harder to comprehend—the less penetrable version.
The dependent variable in both analyses was risk taking, which is the typical dependent
variable used in the gap literature. Exactly how risk taking is defined in the gap literature often
varies. Risky choice behavior in experience can be gleaned from looking at choices unfolding over
time or stopping at some point within a series of choices to ask for a self-reported preference,
whereas in description there is only access to a self-reported preference, often without any
feedback about the outcome of the choice. Therefore, “preference for a risky option” was defined
in two different ways to capture both types of comparisons used in the gap literature.
One method used in the gap literature to compare risk preferences between description and
experience has involved comparing a self-reported preference in description to majority
preferences made over time in a series of experiences. For this purpose, in the current research,
risk taking in description was defined as the proportion of participants who indicated the risky
option when asked which option they would prefer to play. This was the first question asked in the
description task. This was compared to risk taking in experience, as defined by the proportion of
participants who chose risky decks more than half of the time in the last forty trials of the card task
(more than 20 times).
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The above criterion is a common one that has been used in the gap literature. However, it
equates a self-report measure with a behavioral measure. The options that participants say they
prefer might be different from what their behavior reveals about their preferences. Therefore,
another method used to compare risk preferences involves comparing self-reported preferences in
both description and experience. For this comparison, risk taking in description and experience
were defined as the proportion of participants who indicated a risky option when asked which
option they would prefer to play if they had only a single trial. Again, this was the first question
asked in description. In experience, it was the first question asked after the series of 200 choices
in the card task was completed.
For each of the penetrability groups, chi-square analyses were conducted to identify
whether there were differences in risk preferences between description and experience. This was
done for each of the two methods used in the gap literature to compare risk preferences, and
separately for the positive and negative set. The dependent variable was counts of the number of
participants who indicated a preference for either the risky or the sure thing options.
Was the D-E gap replicated in the more penetrable version? In the more penetrable
version, risk preferences were expected to be in accordance with probability weighting predictions
associated with the D-E gap. This was expected, despite the more penetrable version technically
being more complex than the standard, because the payoff structure was still easy to consciously
comprehend. In description, prospect theory predictions were expected to hold, with risk averse
preferences for gains and risk seeking preferences for losses (Hypothesis 5A). The opposite pattern
was predicted a priori for experience (Hypothesis 5B), though was not expected to hold based on
analyses comparing mean and individual preferences.
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Figure 11. Graph of observed results for the influence of information source and valence on risk
taking, in the more cognitively penetrable version. Experience (Over Time) refers to participants
who chose risky decks more than 20 times in the last 40 trials. Experience (Self-Report) refers to
self-reporting a preference for a risky deck when asked after the card task was over. For
description, N=51 for the negative group, and N=55 for the positive group. Proportions above the
bold line (50%) indicate a risky preference, below the bold line indicate a sure-thing preference.
There were differences in risk preferences between description and experience in the more
penetrable version, but only in the negative domain. Observed in the left panel of Figure 11, in the
negative domain, risky options were often preferred in description, as expected. Risky options
were still often preferred in experience, but there was a significant reduction from description in
the proportion of participants with a risk preference. This was the case when description was
compared to risk taking over time in experience, χ2(1)=10.90, p<.001. This was also the case when
comparing description to risk taking via self-report in experience, χ2(1)=14.75, p<.001. Observed
in the right panel of Figure 10, in the positive domain, there was no difference in the proportion of
participants who preferred risky options between description and experience (over time),
χ2(1)=0.002, p=.96, and between description and experience (self-report), χ2(1)=0.06, p=.81.
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Roughly the same proportion of those in description and experience (30%) had a preference for
risky options. This was an expected risk preference pattern for description, but not for experience.
In summary, risk preference patterns associated with the D-E gap were replicated for
description but not for experience, with a choice task involving four single-outcome options rather
than two as in standard D-E gap tasks. That is, risk preferences still followed probability weighting
predictions in description. However, this was not the case for experience. Instead, risk preferences
generally followed somatic marker predictions, as shown previously in analyses comparing mean
and individual preferences.
Does the D-E gap extend to the less penetrable version? In the less penetrable version,
risk preferences were expected to be different for description and experience, but not necessarily
in line with the D-E gap.
In description, this meant risky options should have still been preferred in the negative set
and sure-thing options in the positive set, but a weaker difference was possible (Hypothesis 6A).
A weaker difference was possible because information was presented in a more complex fashion,
potentially making it harder to process, especially if there were no somatic markers developed
from experience with the options to help guide choice. In experience, risky options should have
been preferred in the negative set and sure-thing options in the positive set, if somatic markers
played a dominant role when there was potential difficulty in processing (Hypothesis 6B).
Differences in risk preferences between description and experience were similar to patterns
observed in the more penetrable version. In the negative domain, as seen in the left panel of Figure
12, risky options were still preferred in description and experience, with a reduction from
description to experience in the proportion of participants with a risk preference. This was
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regardless of measuring risk taking over time, χ2(1)=7.98, p<.01, and via self report, χ2(1)=3.90,
p<.05, in experience. In the positive domain, as seen in the right panel of Figure 11, there was
again no difference in the proportion of participants who preferred risky options between
description and experience. This was the case when measuring risk taking over time, χ2(1)=0.44,
p=.50, and via self report, χ2(1)=0.45, p=.50, in experience. Similar proportions of those in
description (35%) and experience (29%) had a preference for risky options.

Figure 12. Graph of observed results for the influence of information source and valence on risk
taking, in the less cognitively penetrable version. Experience (Over Time) refers to participants
who chose risky decks more than 20 times in the last 40 trials. Experience (Self-Report) refers to
self-reporting a preference for a risky deck when asked after the card task was over. For
description, N=53 for the negative group, and N=51 for the positive group. Proportions above the
bold line (50%) indicate a risky preference, below the bold line indicate a sure-thing preference.
Against predictions, the risk preference patterns in description did not weaken from the
more to less penetrable version, and were similar regardless of penetrability. Most participants
preferred risky options in the negative domain (88% in more penetrable, 87% in less penetrable),
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χ2(1)=0.05, p=.82. In the positive domain, few participants preferred risky options (29% in more
penetrable, 35% in less penetrable), χ2(1)=0.47, p=.49.
In summary, risk preference patterns in description were similar from the more to less
penetrable versions. This was not surprising after reviewing how those in the description task were
often able to correctly report objective features of the reward/punishment schedule, and felt that
the schedule was fairly easy to understand, even in the less penetrable version. Patterns likely
remained similar because even when description is made more or less complex, it cannot change
the fact that all outcome and probability information is explicitly provided. In line with analyses
comparing mean preferences, risk preference patterns in experience generally followed somatic
marker predictions. Patterns looked similar between more and less penetrable versions, and
between measuring risk taking over time and via self-report. Thus, the attempt to extend the D-E
gap to more complex situations was generally successful for description, but not for experience.
Is there a D-E gap in terms of advantageous preferences? The primary focus of the gap
literature has been on how decisions from description and experience differ in terms of risk
preferences. The impact of the differences between description and experience is likely not limited
to risk taking. Given the effect of cognitive penetrability on advantageous decision making
revealed in the group analysis, and the likely inherent difference in penetrability between
description and experience, the gap may extend to advantageous decision making. Analyses were
conducted in order to assess evidence of a D-E gap across more and less cognitively penetrable
versions.
For each of the penetrability groups, chi-square analyses were conducted to identify
whether there were differences in advantageous preferences between description and experience.
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This was done for each of the two methods used in the gap literature to compare preferences, and
separately for the positive and negative set. The dependent variable was counts of the number of
participants who indicated a preference for either the advantageous or the disadvantageous options.
More Penetrable

Less Penetrable

Figure 13. Graph of observed results for the influence of information source and valence on
advantageous decision making. The graph on the left is a more penetrable version, the graph on
the right is a less penetrable version. Experience (Over Time) refers to participants who chose
advantageous decks more than 20 times in the last 40 trials. Experience (Self-Report) refers to
self-reporting a preference for an advantageous deck when asked after the card task was over.
Proportions above the bold line (50%) indicate an advantageous preference, below the bold line
indicate a disadvantageous preference.
As shown in the left graph of Figure 13, there were some differences in advantageous
preferences between description and experience in the more penetrable version. This was the result
of differences between description and experience in the positive, but not the negative, domain. In
the negative domain, it did not matter if participants completed the description or experience task,
most participants (between 84% and 90%) had an advantageous preference, χ2(1)=0.86, p=.35.
The positive domain is where the differences between description and experience were observed,
with more participants in description having an advantageous preference than those in experience.
This was the case when description was compared to advantageous decision making over time in
experience, χ2(1)=7.28, p<.05. When description was compared to advantageous decision making

82

via self report in experience, differences in advantageous preferences were less pronounced, just
reaching the cutoff for significance, χ2(1)=3.74, p=.05.
As shown in the right graph of Figure 13, there were differences in advantageous
preferences between description and experience in the less penetrable version, and they were
similar to, though more exaggerated than, those in the more penetrable version. Again, in the
negative domain, it did not matter if participants completed the description or experience task—
most (roughly 80%) participants chose advantageous options, χ2(1)=0.06, p=.80. The positive
domain is where the differences between description and experience were again observed, with
many more participants in description having an advantageous preference than those in experience.
This was the case when description was compared to advantageous decision making in experience
over time, χ2(1)=16.28, p<.001, and via self report, χ2(1)=17.87, p<.001. In description, a
whopping 94% of participants preferred an advantageous option. In experience, however, it was
only about 58%.
In the positive domain, self-reported advantageous preferences in experience weakened
from the more to less penetrable version, χ2(1)=6.36, p<.05. About 80% of participants selfreported a preference for advantageous decks in the more penetrable version, compared to only
58% of participants in the less penetrable version. There was no evidence of weakening when
advantageous decision making was measured over time, χ2(1)=2.25, p=.13. In the negative
domain, advantageous preferences in experience did not weaken from the more to less penetrable
version, when measured over time, χ2(1)=1.60, p=.21, or via self report, χ2(1)=1.73, p=.19.
In summary, regardless of whether the reinforcement schedule was easier to understand or
harder to understand, the pattern of advantageous preferences was similar between description and
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experience, but more exaggerated when harder to understand. A description-experience gap was
observed in advantageous decision making but only in the gain domain, wherein more participants
chose advantageously in description than in experience. A deeper look within the gain domain
revealed that the gap was larger when information was less penetrable with fewer participants
having self-reported advantageous preferences than in the more penetrable version of experience.
There was no difference in advantageous preferences between the two tasks in the loss domain
regardless of cognitive penetrability. Thus, making advantageous choices was superior when the
outcome and probability information was explicitly provided rather than learned over time, but
only when all options led to a gain in the long run.
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Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was to bring together two bodies of literature often used to
explain how we make risky decisions. One body of research focuses on cognitive processes, and
involves probability weighting predictions associated with the description-experience (D-E) gap.
Another body of research provides an emotion-based explanation of how we make decisions from
experience, and involves predictions based on the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH).
When making decisions from experience, comparisons of the two explanations yielded
support primarily for the somatic marker hypothesis and not probability weighting predictions.
However, the support was limited, due to a difference in support between the positive and negative
domains. This suggests a possible asymmetry in mechanisms across the positive and negative
domains, the details of which are reviewed in the first section of the discussion.
In addition to comparing the two explanations in experience, decisions from experience
were compared to decisions from description to determine whether the D-E gap extends to
situations that are more complex. Evidence was mixed. Gap predictions for risk preferences were
as predicted for description but not for experience. Risk preference patterns for experience were
more similar to those in description than to predictions based on overweighting of rare events.
Thus, the probability weighting explanation was consistent with findings for description (with
overweighting of rare events) but the SMH predictions (with stronger markers for sure thing
options) were supported in experience, especially in the gain domain. Preference patterns for both
description and experience were generally similar across penetrability groups. A follow-up
analysis revealed a new kind of D-E gap in which advantageous decision making is stronger in
85

description, but only in the gain domain. The implications from studying these issues with
cognitive penetrability are reviewed in the second section of the discussion.
Support for Somatic Marker Predictions in Experience
In the positive domain, participants generally preferred the sure thing, but were less able
to make advantageous choices compared to the negative domain. If participants were more able to
choose the sure thing, it might then be expected that they would also be more able to choose
advantageous decks, but that was not the case. In the negative domain, preference for the risk was
typically weak, with some disagreement between participants regarding whether the risk or sure
thing was preferred. However, participants were more able to make advantageous choices
compared to the positive domain. If participants were more able to choose advantageous decks,
then they might be expected that they would also be more able to choose the risky deck, but this
was not found.
These experience results are not easily explained by the SMH, when considering that the
SMH rests on the assumption that the strength of somatic markers is based primarily on frequency
of outcomes. For instance, in the negative domain, according to the SMH, participants were more
able to choose the advantageous decks because the somatic markers developed were stronger in
the negative than positive domain. But if that were true, it would also follow that the strength of
risk preferences should have been stronger in the negative domain. However, participants were
not more able to choose the risky decks. According to the SMH, participants were less able to
choose the risky decks because the somatic markers developed were weaker in the negative than
positive domain. A disconnect is then created that is not easily resolved—if advantageous decision
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making relies on stronger somatic markers, why would those stronger markers not also improve
the ability to differentiate the risky and sure thing options?
A potential asymmetry in the development of positive versus negative somatic
markers. If the SMH is to be used to explain the experience results, then the results reveal an
asymmetry in how the ultimate strength of somatic markers is determined in the positive versus
negative domain. The potential for differential sensitivities to gains and losses is consistent with
one of the basic tenets of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) known as loss aversion,
wherein “losses loom larger than gains.”
A possible explanation for the asymmetry, and why those in the negative domain were
more able to make advantageous choices than those in the positive domain, comes from work by
Weller, Levin, Shiv, and Bechara (2007). Weller and colleagues argued that advantageous decision
making may depend on separate neural systems in the gain and loss domains. The specific brain
regions examined were the amygdala, an area responsible for processing emotional responses, and
the VMPFC, and area responsible for integrating cognitive and emotional information. The authors
found that, in both the gain and loss domains, VMPFC damage was associated with suboptimal
decision making. That is, participants with VMPFC damage were often not sensitive to EV. Those
with damage to the amygdala were also generally insensitive to EV, but only in the gain domain.
In the loss domain, their behavior was similar to that of healthy participants. It was suggested by
the authors that there were redundancies in the neural systems responsible for processing losses;
that is, that the amygdala is important for processing emotional responses, but other brain
structures may produce similar responses. The authors concluded that advantageous decision
making was more difficult to disrupt in the loss than the gain domain. As it relates to the current
study, perhaps those in the negative domain were more able to make advantageous choices than
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those in the positive domain because there were redundant signals from multiple brain structures
regarding which decks were advantageous.
Alluded to in the analysis comparing individual preferences was that the popularity of
decks seemed to be determined primarily by frequency of outcomes in the positive domain, and
EV of the deck in the negative domain. If preferences are primarily driven by frequency in the
positive and EV in the negative, then maybe the ultimate strength of somatic markers is determined
primarily by frequency in the positive and EV in the negative. The EV of the deck, i.e.,
advantageous or disadvantageous, is determined by both frequency of outcomes and size of
outcomes (magnitude). Thus, maybe frequency is important for determining the strength of
somatic markers across both positive and negative domains, but magnitude plays an important role
as well in the negative domain. Support for the overall notion that frequency and magnitude may
contribute differentially to the strength of somatic markers comes from research suggesting that
magnitude and frequency of outcomes are not always processed together and in the same way; in
fact, that they are mostly coded in separate brain structures (e.g., Tobler, O’Doherty, Dolan, &
Schultz, 2006; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004).
In the positive domain, participants in the current study often preferred sure thing decks,
and did not make as many advantageous choices as those in the negative domain. This might have
been due to a primary role of frequency in the gain domain. Perhaps decks that are better in the
long run (higher positive EV) yield a stronger positive somatic marker than decks that are worse
in the long run (lower positive EV). However, decks with a sure gain might also yield a strong
positive somatic marker than decks with a risky gain. If the decks with a sure gain yield a stronger
positive somatic marker than decks that are better in the long run, then the ultimate strength of
somatic markers would be determined primarily by frequency, resulting in a dominant approach
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strategy for sure thing decks. Consistent with this idea, Venkatraman, Payne, and Huettel (2014)
demonstrated that the Pwin heuristic, which involves focusing on the overall probability of
winning, is a commonly used strategy when making decisions. They found that, in the context of
multi-outcome mixed gambles, people often made risky decisions consistent with a focus on the
probability of winning, even if that meant behaving disadvantageously.
In the negative domain, participants in the current study often did not have a convincing
preference for the risk, and made more advantageous choices than those in the positive domain.
This might have been due to the combined influence of frequency and magnitude in the loss
domain. Perhaps decks that are worse in the long run (higher negative EV) yield a strong negative
somatic marker than decks that are better in the long run (lower negative EV). However, decks
with a sure loss might also yield a strong negative somatic marker than decks with a risky loss. If
the decks with a worse loss in the long run yield a stronger negative somatic marker than decks
with a risky loss, then the ultimate strength of somatic markers would be determined primarily by
EV, or frequency and magnitude. This would result in a dominant avoidance strategy for decks
with a worse loss in the long run.
An assumption of the SMH is that the strength of somatic markers is determined primarily
by the frequency of outcomes. If the SMH is to be used to explain the experience results, then this
dissertation seems to indicate that the strength of somatic markers can be jointly determined by
frequency and magnitude, and the extent to which each is contributing to the strength of somatic
markers seems to depend on being in the gain or loss domain.
A note about the variability in advantageous performance. Mentioned in the check
before conducting group analyses, participants generally performed advantageously by the end of
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the experience task (despite relative differences between the positive and negative domains).
However, there was a substantial minority that did not perform advantageously by the end—about
25% of participants were not choosing advantageous decks more than half of the time. This was
not completely surprising, as there are previous reports of similar subgroups of healthy participants
that do not perform advantageously by the end of the 100-trial IGT (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006) as well
as the 200-trial IGT (e.g., Bull et al., 2015).
Individual differences likely play a role in why some healthy participants perform
advantageously by the end and other healthy participants do not. According to Bechara and
colleagues (Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Bechara et al., 2000), healthy individuals may differ in
terms of reward and punishment sensitivity. As suggested by Bull and colleagues (2015), healthy
individuals may also differ in learning rate—some participants may need more experience than
others to develop stable advantageous preferences. Bull and colleagues found that increasing the
number of trials from 100 to 200 substantially improved the likelihood of advantageous decision
making by the end of the IGT, supporting the hypothesis that individual differences in learning
rate contributes to the variability in advantageous performance. Bull and colleagues went a step
further. They introduced a separate task which demonstrated that those who were classified as
poor decision makers (those who did not develop strong, stable advantageous preferences by the
end of the 200-trial IGT) were in fact less sensitive to the magnitudes of rewards and punishments
than those who were classified as good decision makers.
In the current study, it is possible that there were individual differences in learning rate. A
large majority of those who were not performing advantageously by the end were at least close to
the cutoff used to classify a preference as advantageous. Participants who were not performing
advantageously by the end might have done so if they had the opportunity to play through more
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than 200 trials. This dissertation supports the suggestion made by Bull and colleagues (2015);
namely, that if we want to understand how healthy people make advantageous decisions on the
IGT and similar experience tasks, it will be important to determine exactly how many trials are
necessary to distinguish between slow learning and true disadvantageous performance.
Why was there no support for probability weighting predictions in experience?
Preferences were not in line with probability weighting predictions in experience. This cannot be
explained away by a lack of penetrability. When outcome and probability information were
initially unknown and had to be learned, participants were generally able to learn the payoff
structure, regardless of being in the more or less penetrable version. Also, the more penetrable
version falls somewhere between standard gap tasks and the standard IGT in terms of penetrability.
The more penetrable version is less complex than the IGT, and other research has provided
evidence that the IGT is more penetrable than previously thought (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006).
This dissertation contributes to the literature on probability weighting in decisions from
experience by helping to elucidate situations in which underweighting may or may not occur.
Previous research has yielded mixed evidence for underweighting in experience, with evidence for
underweighting, overweighting, linear weighting, and smaller overweighting (than in description).
The mixed evidence was summarized by Wulff and colleagues (Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, &
Hertwig, 2018) in their recently-conducted meta-analysis, the purpose of which was to examine
the size and robustness of the description-experience gap. The results of the meta-analysis
demonstrated that the mixed evidence may by the result of various factors, including the use of
substantially different methods when studying experience. When problems involved choosing
between a risky and sure thing option, there was typically evidence for underweighting of rare
events in experience. However, when problems involved choosing between two risky options,
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decisions from experience were similar to decisions from description. The authors concluded that
problem structure, i.e., making a decision between a risk and sure thing versus two risky options,
is an important factor contributing to the mixed evidence for underweighting in experience.
With the identification of problem structure as a key factor in whether or not
underweighting in experience is observed, Wulff and colleagues (2018) provide a potential
explanation for why risk preferences were not in line with probability weighting predictions in the
current study. In the current study, the problem structure involved choosing between two risky and
two sure thing options, not just one of each. Perhaps probability weighting predictions were not
supported in the current study because choosing between multiple risky options mixed with
multiple sure thing options significantly changed the processes used to make decisions in
experience in a way that did not lead to underweighting, compared to choosing between one risky
and one sure thing option. If this was the case, then paradigms often used to study probability
weighting predictions seem to be fairly sensitive to small changes in problem structure.
One of the processes used to make decisions from experience that might have changed with
increasing the number of risky and sure thing options involves information search. Hills, Noguchi,
and Gibbert (2013) studied the effect of number of choices on information search and risky choice
using the sampling paradigm, in which participants learned about the options by sampling from
them without consequence and for as long as they wanted, before making a final decision regarding
which option they preferred. Hills and colleagues manipulated the size and order of the choice sets.
The number of options changed over time for each participant, but some participants made
decisions in choice sets that increased in size from few to many options (2 options to 32 options),
and others made decisions in choice sets that decreased in size from many to few options. The
authors found that, as set size increased, so did risky choice. This was independent of the order of
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the sets. Hills and colleagues argued that the influence of set size on risky decision making was
the result of changes in information search.
In Hills and colleagues (2013), participants sampled without consequence for as long as
they wanted. In the current study, participants sampled with consequence, i.e., they received
feedback about the option they chose, for a predetermined (but unknown to the participants)
amount of time. Thus, mapping these results to the current study may not be clear. However, it
does highlight the importance of understanding the differences that come with using various
paradigms to study probability weighting predictions. You can sample for as long as you want in
the sampling paradigm (used by Hills and colleagues), but not for as long as you want in the
feedback version (used in this dissertation). Therefore, the paradigms differ in terms of the type of
sampling process that is possible. If one of the processes used to make decisions from experience
that changes with an increase in the number of options involves information search, then exactly
how information search changes is likely to depend on whether open-ended search is allowed or
not.
Implications from Studying Cognitive Penetrability
The effect of cognitive penetrability on advantageous decision making in experience.
The primary influence of cognitive penetrability in experience was on advantageous decision
making, and not on risky decision making. Using the SMH to explain this, if somatic markers are
determined primarily by the frequency of outcomes, risk taking should be affected as much or
more by the cognitive penetrability of the situation as advantageous decision making. However,
that was not the case—advantageous decision making was more susceptible to changes in
penetrability than risky decision making. Thus, all else equal, it seems that integrating EV
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information may be more difficult to do when the reinforcement schedule is harder versus easier
to comprehend, perhaps because more information (frequency and magnitude) needs to be
considered in order to determine which decks are advantageous. Extracting out risk information
does not seem to be more difficult to do when the reinforcement schedule is harder versus easier
to understand, all else equal, potentially because less information (frequency only) needs to be
considered in order to determine which decks are risky or sure things.
Another potential explanation for why the primary effect of cognitive penetrability was on
advantageous and not risky decision making involves the use of contextual information regarding
the general positive or negative nature of the situation to inform decisions. Regardless of
penetrability, it may have been even easier for participants to extract and rely upon the general
positive or negative context, than to extract and rely upon information regarding how often and/or
how much they were winning and losing. Participants made decisions within a set of positive
expected value options, or a set of negative expected value options. Thus, the general positivity of
the positive set, or the general negativity of the negative set, was likely clear. The general positive
or negative context may have been useful when making risky choices, and overwhelmed any effect
of cognitive penetrability. However, the general positive or negative context may not have been
useful when making advantageous choices. An overall sense of the positive or negative context
does not necessarily help to distinguish between higher positive or lower negative expected value
options. If the general positive or negative context could not inform advantageous choices,
participants may have instead used information regarding how often and/or how much they were
winning and losing, yielding an effect of cognitive penetrability on advantageous choices.
Differences in cognitive penetrability between description and experience. There was
an effect of information source on objective and subjective measures of cognitive penetrability.
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That is, those in description were more likely to correctly report objective features of the reward
structure, and reported higher levels of understanding the options, than those in experience.
Manipulating cognitive penetrability in both description and experience tasks confirmed a
potentially obvious but important difference between the two kinds of decisions—that description
may be more cognitively penetrable than experience.
Information is explicitly provided in description, but is inferred over time in experience.
The reward/punishment schedule may be easier to comprehend in description than experience
because it likely requires less cognitive resources to access the outcome and probability
information directly in front of you as opposed to relying on memories of and inferences about
past experiences with the options. Additionally, description may be more penetrable than
experience because of the completeness of the information that is presented (Hadar & Fox, 2009;
Glockner, Hilbig, Henninger, & Fiedler, 2016). In description, an outcome that is labeled as “100%
likely” or something similar is known to be certain. However, in experience, an alwaysexperienced outcome is not necessarily known to be certain. Even if the decision maker has many
experiences with the outcome, and their confidence that the outcome is certain is high, the fact
remains that the information is still technically less complete than in description. Thus, in the
presence of complete information, the reward/punishment schedule may be easier to comprehend
correctly in description than experience. This can help explain why those in description were more
likely to be accurate in reporting features of the reinforcement schedule than those in experience—
those in description had access to complete outcome and probability information, in contrast to
those in experience.
An interesting finding was that more participants were able to choose advantageously in
description than experience in the gain domain. In other words, in the gain domain, when people
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used their experience to make choices about which options were best in the long run, they were
hindered in a way that people who used a descriptive summary were not. Considering that
description may be more cognitively penetrable than experience, this finding has implications for
making decisions in more applied settings. For example, a doctor has their choice of a variety of
medications to prescribe to a patient. All of the medications may be effective in the long run;
however, the medications may differ in terms of the possible side effects and the likelihood of the
side effects being experienced by the patient. When choosing the best medication to prescribe, the
doctor likely has access to a descriptive summary provided by the manufacturer, and experience
providing the medication to other patients. Results from the current study suggest that the doctor
may be better off relying on a descriptive summary (and the complete information that the
summary explicitly provides) rather than their experience when choosing the best medication to
prescribe.
Implications for research on the description-experience (D-E) gap. The primary focus
of gap research has been on how decisions from description and experience differ in terms of risk
preferences. The current research attempted to extend the standard D-E gap to more complex
situations, but the extension was only partially successful. When comparing risk preferences
between description and experience in the negative and positive domains, risk preferences were as
predicted for description but not for experience. Risk preference patterns looked similar for
description and experience, and the similarity held across penetrability groups. The group analysis
demonstrated the effect of cognitive penetrability on advantageous and not risk preferences, and
the tests of the effectiveness of the cognitive penetrability manipulation suggested that description
may be more cognitively penetrable than experience. Thus, whether the D-E gap extended to
advantageous decision making was also explored. There were differences in advantageous
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preferences between description and experience, such that more participants had an advantageous
preference in description versus experience, but only in the gain domain. More participants in the
gain domain chose advantageously in the more penetrable versus less penetrable version of
experience.
This dissertation demonstrates the importance of understanding the impact that cognitive
penetrability can have on the differences between description and experience. Advantageous
decision making in description was not impacted by making the reinforcement schedule easier or
harder to understand, likely because complete information was explicitly provided in description,
no matter how it was presented. Advantageous decision making in experience was impacted by
making the reinforcement schedule easier or harder to understand, such that more participants
chose advantageously when the schedule was easier versus harder to understand. Experience was
likely influenced by the cognitive penetrability of the situation because outcome and probability
information was initially unknown and had to be learned over time. How easy or difficult it was
to understand the information that was presented was paramount to learning about the options in
general and about the options that were best in the long run. Advantageous decision making in
experience was impacted by cognitive penetrability, but only in the gain domain. That is, in
experience, it seems that choosing the decks that led to a higher gain in the long run was harder to
do when the reinforcement schedule was harder to understand, and this difficulty did not translate
to the loss domain. Nevertheless, with description likely being more penetrable than experience
from the outset, the cognitive penetrability manipulation affected the two tasks differently,
resulting in a “difference of differences” between description and experience.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Testing the mechanism behind the somatic marker predictions. This dissertation was
a first step in comparing probability weighting and somatic marker predictions, using cognitive
penetrability to help distinguish between the two explanations. In experience, preferences were
generally in line with those predicted by the SMH, though support was limited. This limited
support provides potentially important information regarding the nature of somatic markers—that
the strength of them may be determined primarily by frequency, or by a more equal contribution
of frequency and magnitude, and how strength is determined likely depends on being in the gain
or loss domain.
To further test the SMH, and to help achieve a more long-term goal of understanding how
cognitive and emotional processes interact to influence decision making, the mechanism by which
somatic markers influence decision making needs to be better specified. Questions need to be
answered regarding the process by which many somatic states can be triggered at one time, but are
eventually integrated into an overall somatic state that assists in the selection of an advantageous
response (Dunn et al., 2006). The proposed asymmetry in how the strength of somatic markers is
determined suggests that the process of integration into an overall state may be different in the
gain or loss domain, but more work is still needed to clarify the process.
Part of specifying the somatic marker mechanism involves determining how best to
measure somatic markers. An often-used index of somatic marker generation is
psychophysiological data in the form of skin conductance responses (SCRs). Studies measuring
SCRs are often used to support the claim that disadvantageous performance on the IGT is the result
of a failure to generate somatic markers (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999). However, there are difficulties
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with using SCRs as an index of somatic marker generation. As mentioned by Dunn and colleagues
(2006), it is unclear if the SCR represents a signal of goodness or badness (as proposed by the
SMH) or something else like an indicator of risk. Thus, in order to better specify the mechanism
by which somatic markers influence decision making, including measurements of other types of
feedback from the body (e.g., facial feedback, heart rate) in addition to SCRs is likely necessary
to get a more accurate picture of what is happening in the body. Considering that the strength of
somatic markers may be dependent upon being in the gain or loss domain, measurements that are
sensitive to discriminating between positive and negative valence should be particularly useful.
Manipulating and measuring cognitive penetrability. In the current research, there were
effects of the cognitive penetrability manipulation. There were (albeit small) differences in
accuracy and impressions between more and less penetrable versions, and penetrability had an
effect on advantageous decision making. More work is needed to disentangle which features of a
situation make it more or less cognitively penetrable. Potential features include the number of
outcomes experienced in a given experience trial, and the number of options available from which
to choose. Disentangling would not only strengthen the manipulation, but also allow for a deeper
understanding of the cognitive processes that are responsible for making the reward structure easy
or difficult to comprehend in general. For example, perhaps the cognitive processes that are
responsible for making the reward structure easy or difficult to comprehend are different from
those that put more or less strain on working memory. Disentangling would also allow for a deeper
understanding of the cognitive processes that are responsible for the effect of penetrability on
advantageous decision making.
Measurements of cognitive penetrability were developed in response to criticisms of other
work done on the cognitive penetrability of the standard IGT (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004;
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Persaud et al., 2007). One criticism was that questions prompted participants to develop conscious
knowledge of the reward structure as a result of simply answering them. Therefore, in an effort to
ensure that answering them would not impact behavior in the current research, questions were
asked after the experience task was completed. After refining how to best measure cognitive
penetrability, future studies can include measurements as participants are completing the
experience task in order to test how penetrability changes over time. Studying how penetrability
changes over time can help shed light on how advantageous decision making changes over time.
For example, perhaps the payoff structure is learned earlier, corresponding to more advantageous
choices being made earlier, in a more penetrable versus a less penetrable situation.
Conclusion
Common ways in which we make sense of uncertain situations include relying on described
summary information that is available to us, or relying on our experience through repeated
interaction with and feedback from the environment. Two bodies of literature are often used to
explain how we make decisions when relying on these kinds of information. One body of research
focuses on cognitive processes, and predictions are based on probability weighting. Another body
of research provides an emotion-based explanation, and predictions are based on the somatic
marker hypothesis. In this dissertation, I attempted to bring together these two perspectives and
their respective research paradigms in an effort to better understand how we make decisions.
When making decisions from experience, comparisons of the two explanations yielded
support primarily for the somatic marker hypothesis. However, if the somatic marker hypothesis
is to be used to explain the results, and more broadly how we make decisions from experience, it
needs to be clearer how somatic markers are formed. Evidence from this dissertation suggests that
the ultimate strength of somatic markers may be determined primarily by frequency, or by a
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combination of frequency and magnitude. Importantly, the extent to which it is frequency, or
frequency and magnitude, likely depends on being in the gain or loss domain.
The primary effect of cognitive penetrability was on advantageous decision making and
not on risk taking. Furthermore, description was found to be more cognitively penetrable than
experience. The difference in penetrability between description and experience is likely due to the
explicit availability and completeness of the outcome and probability information in description,
and is important to consider when trying explaining differences in preferences between the two
tasks. This research is a first step in providing a direct comparison between predictions based on
probability weighting and the somatic marker hypothesis, and contributes to our understanding of
how and why decisions from description and experience may differ.
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Appendix A:
Descriptive Statistics and Testing of the Normality Assumption
Two separate ANOVAs were conducted to identify the overall effects of cognitive penetrability
and valence on decisions from experience. The normality assumption was tested by computing the
number of times that each of the four decks was chosen in the last forty trials for each participant.
Summary statistics were organized by the four between-subjects groups in experience. The
assumption was first tested via the Shapiro-Wilk test, and subsequently tested by reviewing
skewness (symmetry) and kurtosis (tails) of the distributions.
For each of the four decks in each of the between-subjects groups, with the exception of
one deck in one group, the Shapiro-Wilk test was significant. (See Table A1 for the results of the
Shapiro-Wilk tests, with significant p values highlighted in dark gray). These results suggested
that there were at least some deviations from normality.
The severity of the violation was assessed by examining the skewness and kurtosis values
for each of the four decks in each of the between-subjects groups. (See Table A1 for skewness and
kurtosis values.) A common criterion was used for judging acceptable skewness and kurtosis
values—values between -2 and +2 are typically considered acceptable and the deviation from
normality is unlikely to adversely affect ANOVA results (e.g., George & Mallery, 2010; Gravetter
& Wallnau, 2014). Using this criterion, all skewness values fell within the acceptable range. All
kurtosis values but two fell within the acceptable range. (Values outside of the acceptable range
are highlighted in dark gray in Table A1.) The two kurtosis values that were outside of the
acceptable range were in reference to the sure-thing disadvantageous deck in the positive set, and
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indicate that the distributions were leptokurtic (i.e., the distribution had heavier tails, or more
extreme values, than a normal distribution). A review of the histograms revealed that there was a
heavier left tail; that is, most participants chose the deck closer to the extreme value of zero times.
The two kurtosis values outside of the acceptable range were not considered a major issue because
1) problems with kurtosis can increase the Type 1 error rate, but even when using a stricter alpha
criterion, results remained significant, and 2) mean comparisons are less influenced by kurtosis
than skewness, and there were no issues with skewness (e.g., Cain, Zhang, & Yuan, 2017).
Table A1
Descriptive statistics in experience

Though the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated that the normality assumption was
violated, a review of skewness and kurtosis suggested that the violation was minor. There were no
issues with skewness. There were only small issues with kurtosis with one deck in two of the
between-subjects groups. Because ANOVA is generally robust to violations of normality (e.g.,
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Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012; Pallant, 2007), and the violation was minor, the two separate
ANOVAs were conducted as planned.
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Appendix B:
Summary of ANOVA Results
Table B1
Summary of Between-Subjects ANOVA Results on Accuracy as a Function of Cognitive
Penetrability and Information Source

Table B2
Summary of MANOVA Results on Impressions as a Function of Cognitive Penetrability and
Information Source

Table B3
Summary of Mixed ANOVA Results on Advantageous Decision Making as a Function of
Cognitive Penetrability, Valence, and Risk
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Table B4
Summary of Mixed ANOVA Results on Advantageous Decision Making as a Function of
Cognitive Penetrability, Valence, and EV
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